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Abstract
This work considers the soundness of Henry Frankfurt's argument that the
principle of alternative possibilities is false and the implications of his argument for
holding agents responsible in a causally determined universe. Frankfurt does seem to be
pointing clearly to the fact that many of us do continue to hold agents responsible despite
a lack of alternative possjbilities. What Frankfurt may be lacking is an adequate account
of control which is taken up by John Martin Fischer. What Fischer presents us with is the
possibility that the reason why we continue to hold Jones responsible is because of the
kind of control that agents maintain. He contends that because Jones has guidance control
of his actions, Jones is morally responsible. My contention has been that Jones does not
have sufficient control to be held responsible because, despite Fischer's claim to the
contrary, Jones does not actually have a reasons-responsive mechanism and, so, Jones
also does not have guidance control. Instead, it seems that Jones' actions are only
reasons-resultant as he cannot actually respond to reasons-even in relevantly similar
possible worlds.

IV
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Introduction
A few years ago, when I presented my first paper on Harry Frankfurt, I was surprised
that so few people in the audience knew anything about Dr. Frankfurt's work. What was
especially amazing to me was the first question I was asked about my presentation. It was
something akin to, "Why does all this stuff about responsibility matter?" This question may
also occur to you while reading this work, so I will address it now.
In order to convince the reader that it is important, consider the general problem
around which this paper revolves: how do we rationally decide if an agent is morally
responsible? Looking at this question, we notice a couple of things: 1) There is a kind of
responsibility which may be distinct from other kinds of responsibility-namely, moral
responsibility, and 2) This assumes that moral responsibility is something which we should
cognate upon in order to understand better. In other words we have to figure out what it is and
how it works. This paper will deal with whether agents can be held responsible for their
actions in a universe in which all events are the direct result of the summation of the events
preceding them-one which is causally determined. A causally determined universe is
essentially one such that, in theory, we can predict what will happen next. In other words,
there is only one way things can go-the way that is dictated by summation of all information
in the universe.
Can agents be held responsible in a causally determined universe-a universe in
which all oftheir actions are the direct result of the facts preceding them? By "responsible," I
will largely mean "morally responsible." If an agent is the cause of an event, he or she is
responsible, but he or she may only be "causally" responsible. Agents are often causally
responsible and, yet, we do not praise or blame them for the event. For example, if an agent
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has a disorder which causes the agent to shoplift against his or her will, we may not blame the
agent for the shoplifting, yet we also recognize that the agent is physically responsible for the
event. We do tend to absolve agents when they commit acts over which they have no control,
so one wonders if the world is such that all of our actions are causally determined, can we
rationally be held morally responsible? To be morally responsible, then, is to be more than
just responsible; it is to be such that an agent should be praised or blamed for an event.
So why is this question important? Practically, it is important because we may not be
surprised to find out that the world is causally determined-or close to it. It is likely very
useful for us, as a species, to know how, when, and how much we should praise and blame
others. So it seems that, at least on a practical level, knowing if we can, and how we can most
reasonably hold agents morally responsible in a causally determined universe may affect
greatly how we deal with assign praise and blame. At the very least, this will likely deeply
affect our punitive and judicial methodologies. More deeply, it matters philosophically,
because ethics loses a great deal of traction if no one can rationally be held morally
responsible.
In this work, I will be dealing with some specific problems raised in the debate over
moral responsibility in a causally determined universe. I will be focusing on two primary
figures in the discourse: Harry G. Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer, both of whom have
greatly affected the literature. Frankfurt's work has radically challenged some of our
seemingly fundamental intuitions about moral responsibility through the presentation of some
particularly forceful counter-examples. He challenges the notion that agents should be
absolved for actions just because the agent had no choice but to commit the act. His counterexamples demonstrate with considerable success that an agent may not need choices (the
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ability to do otherwise) in order to be held morally responsible for his actions. This idea, that
the agent must have the ability to do other than he does in order to be held morally
responsible is called the "principle of alternative possibilities" or PAP. Fischer also focuses
on this result of the Frankfurtian counter-examples, but he concludes that there is a very
specific reason why an agent need not be able to do otherwise in order to be morally
responsible-namely, control. Fischer argues that what Frankfurt really shows us is that what
matters in regards to an agent's moral responsibility is whether or not the agent has a
particular kind of control which he terms "guidance control."
This work will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will present Frankfurt's case and
explain how it is that he comes to the conclusion that PAP is false. I will then consider
whether his argument provides a sufficient counter-example to PAP. In order to defend
Frankfurt's case, some argue that his argument works even when the intentional states of the
agent are restricted by deterministic causes. I will consider the ramifications of that claimnamely, that it may result in Frankfurt's argument begging the question. In the end, though,
this criticism may simply miss the thrust of Frankfurt's argument and, so, I will consider what
it is that Frankfurt's argument tells us about intentional states.
In the second part I will consider John Martin Fischer's account of moral

responsibility as it was motivated by shortcomings in Frankfurt's position. I will present the
account of moral responsibility as espoused by Fischer and his collaborator Mark Ravizza, a
position that also denies the truth ofPAP. I will briefly consider two concerns then I will
move on to what I term to be "the problem of Mr. Black." The problem, as I will argue, is that
their position generates the counter-intuitive conclusion that two agent's may be held morally
responsible for one agent's action as well as intentional states. This problem will motivate a
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significant addendum to Fischer's and Ravizza's account. This addendum, which is the
recognition that there can be a distinction made between mechanisms which are responsive to
reasons and mechanisms which are not responsive to reasons, will result in some changes in
regards to ascriptions of moral responsibility in Frankfurtian counter-examples. Finally, I will
consider my account as challenged by the one of the strongest arguments against
compatibilism.
Part I: Frankfurt and His Alleged Counter-Examples.
Ch.l The Initial Landscape
With the introduction of his "revised principle of alternative possibilities" Remy
Frankfurt changed the landscape of the debate over determinism and moral responsibility.
Frankfurt, in one groundbreaking paper, brought into serious question the assumption that,

"An agent can only be held morally responsible ifhe or she could have done otherwise."!
Although this statement seems quite intuitive, Frankfurt presents counter-examples to PAP.
These counter examples, now known as "Frankfurtian counter-examples" have become quite
famous in the field and although they have subsequently undergone substantial revision, they
remain a mainstay of the argument against PAP.
The essence of a Frankfurtian counter-example is this: an agent, let us call him
"Jones," believes that he has the choice between two options. In fact, he does not because of
certain contravening factors (we might say that there is an agent "Black" who can interfere
with Jones' action without Jones' knowledge). Jones is unable to take anything other than one
predetermined action. So, although he believes he has the choice between options A and B, in
reality, he will take option A. Frankfurt's point revolves around the following event: Jones

I

Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23
(1969): p. 838.
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takes the action A, and no intervention was required by Black-he willingly chose to do A
and acted in such a way as to bring A about. The intuition though seems to be that, despite
Jones' lack of an alternative possibility, he is responsible because he does A, and no
intervention on the part of Black was required to make Jones do A. It seems that Frankfurt has
provided a counter-example to PAP. An agent may have only one metaphysically possible
option (epistemologically, Jones may believe he has the ability to do A or not do A) and still
be held morally responsible.
Those who accept Frankfurt's account, or variations of it, are now named "neocompatibilists." Perhaps the foremost of these neo-compatibilists is John Martin Fischer.
Fischer does not agree with the entirety of Frankfurt's initial account, but he has teased out
some of the significant reasons why Frankfurtian counter-examples intuitively appeal to us.
Fischer has argued that it is not an alternative possibility that moral responsibility requires (as
demonstrated by Frankfurtian counter-examples) but, instead, control. Fischer rejects the
generally accepted dogma that moral responsibility requires freedom. Whereas classical
compatibilists accept this picture-they try to prove that we can be free in a causally
determined world-Fischer concedes to the incompatibilist that freedom does require
alternative possibilities. Instead, he attacks the idea that moral responsibility requires freedom
by using Frankfurt's counter-examples to demonstrate that responsibility only requires a
particular kind of control.

2

There are at least two challenges to both Frankfurt and Fischer. First, I will argue that
Frankfurt's examples are not true counter-examples. I will conclude, simply, that Frankfurt, in
his examples, does not provide us with situations in which the agent in question does not have
2

Robert Kane. A Contempormy Introduction to Free Will. Fundamentals ofPhilosophy Series. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
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alternate possibilities. It may seem prima-facie that Frankfurt provides the reader with cases
in which the agent does not actually have alternative possibilities, but once one looks deeper,
one can see that Frankfurt's examples only provide us with examples of an agent who cannot
do other than bring about a specific event but not examples of an agent who cannot intend

otherwise. There are, of course, numerous responses to this claim, and I will attempt to
address the most pressing of them.
Fischer argues that what Frankfurtian counter-examples actually demonstrate is close
to my preceding point, that the agent in the examples is still held responsible, despite a lack of
alternative possibilities, because the agent still has a kind of control-what Fischer terms
"guidance control." According to Fischer, "An agent exercises guidance control of his
behavior insofar as it issues from his own, appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism.,,3 It
is only this kind of control that is necessary for an agent to be held morally accountable. I will
consider some of what it means to have control and how legitimate Fischer's claim that an
agent is still responsible ifhe or she has only what he terms "guidance control" despite a lack
of what he terms "regulative control," "which is the freedom to choose and do otherwise.,,4 In
Fischer's examples, one agent has regulative control (Mr. Black) and the other agent only has
guidance control (Mr. Jones). Moreover, Mr. Black, unlike Mr. Jones, has the ability to
prevent the event from coming about and the ability to ensure that it does come about. I will
focus on what I consider to be a rather odd result of accepting Fischer's analysis of
Frankfurtian counter-examples: namely, that there are two agents who can be held responsible

3

John Martin Fischer. "Compatibilism." Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p. 78.

4

Ibid. p. 57.
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for bringing about an event at the same time, despite the fact that one of those agents has the
ability to prevent or ensure that the event comes about, and the other does not.
This work will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will present Frankfurt's case and
explain how it is that he comes to the conclusion that PAP is false. I will then consider
whether his argument truly does act as a counter-example to PAP. In order to salvage
Frankfurt's case, some argue that his argument works even when the intentional states of the
agent are restricted. I will consider the ramifications of that claim-namely, that it may result
in Frankfurt's argument begging the question. In the end, though, this criticism may simply
miss the thrust of Frankfurt's argument and, so, I will consider what it is that Frankfurt's
argument tells us about intentional states.

In the second part I will consider Fischer's account of moral responsibility as
motivated by flaws in Frankfurt's work. I will present the account of moral responsibility as
generated by Fischer and Mark Ravizza, which also denies the truth of PAP. I will briefly
consider two concerns, which their account brings to my mind and then move on to what I
term to be "the problem of Mr. Black." This problem, that two agent's may both be held
morally responsible for one agent's action and intentional states will motivate what I believe
to be is a significant addendum to Fischer's and Ravizza's account. This addendum, which is
the recognition there can be a distinction made between mechanisms which are responsive to
reasons and mechanism which are not responsive to reasons, will result in some changes in
regards to ascriptions of moral responsibility in Frankfurtian counter-examples. Finally, I will
consider my account as challenged by the argument against compatibilism.
Until Frankfurt published his paper "Alternative Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility" in 1969, the beliefthat alternative possibilities were necessary for moral
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responsibility was considered by many to be largely unchallengeable. Ever since Immanuel
Kant argued that "ought implies can," very few could argue reasonably that agents can be
held responsible for their actions in a determined universe. This apparent truth seems to entail
also the principle of alternative possibilities and so PAP appeals to our intuitions so
significantly that we base much of our moral judgment upon it. Just as an agent can only be
required to do things that he actually can do, it was considered true that an agent cannot be
blamed for doing what he did ifhe could not do otherwise because that means that the agent is
essentially being blamed for not doing things he could not do or blamed for things he has
done but could not avoid. The idea that "ought implies can" was so intuitively appealing that
we invoke it not only philosophically, but practically, as in cases of determining whether or
not someone should be punished for a crime.
The intuition behind PAP remained effectively unchallenged for many years. To quote
Frankfurt:
Practically no one ... seems inclined to deny or even to question that the principle of
alternate possibilities (construed in some way or other) is true. It has generally seemed
so overwhelmingly plausible that some philosophers have even characterized it as an a
priori truth. People whose accounts of free will or of moral responsibility are radically
at odds evidently find in it a firm and convenient common ground upon which they
can profitably take their opposing stands. 5
In his paper, Frankfurt attempts to brush away hundreds of years of near-dogma regarding
PAP. In order to determine whether or not he is successful one must first gain a deeper
understanding ofPAP and Frankfurt's attack on it.

Ch. 2 Frankfurt's Contribution

5

Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23
(1969): p. 838.
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There seems to be something fundamentally true about the "ought implies can"
principle. Agents are regularly absolved for events over which they are causally responsible,
and, yet, they could not have avoided. If for example, a cute little squirrel scampers
underneath the wheel of my car and I am grief-stricken, my friends are likely to console me
and tell me that "there is nothing you could have done, Nick." Why does this absolve me,
though? I am unquestionably responsible for the death of our poor little furry friend. So, why,
then, do my friends console me so quickly when I berate myself for his untimely demise? Our
initial inclination seems to be to answer that I am absolved because there is little that I could
have done to prevent the death.
Frankfurt tells us that this initial explanation for our act of absolution is incorrect. He
argues that it is not because I could not have done otherwise that I am absolved, but because I
acted only because I could not have done otherwise.

In ask for absolution and provide my

excuse, Frankfurt tells us that "we understand the person who offers the excuse to mean that
he did what he did only because he was unable to do otherwise, or only because he had to do
it.,,6 When the agent's intentions play an essential role in the bringing about of the event, he
may not necessarily be absolved. For the sake of expediency I will refer to the summation of
the agent's motivations, desires, and willings as his "intentions" for the duration of this paper.
To illustrate Frankfurt's point: imagine that I am the kind of person who actually aims for
squirrels while driving; if I see a squirrel on the road, I violently swerve in order to try to kill
it. But, let us say in one particular case, my wheel locks without my knowing it. Moreover, I
see a squirrel directly in front of my tire. Now, it is impossible, because of the locked steering
wheel, for me to avoid hitting the squirrel. Nevertheless, in this case, I do not even try to tum

6

Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23
(1969): p. 838.
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the wheel, because I want to hit the squirrel. After my most recent kill, I notice that my
steering is locked, and return home (with some difficulty). So, then, let us imagine that my
friends and family hold an intervention in order to help me with my squirrel killing problem.
When my friends confront me about killing my most recent squirrel (let's call him "Fluffy"), I
defend myselfby stating, "No, I am not at fault because my steering wheel locked. I hit the
squirrel because I could not do otherwise." Even so, in this case, we may not so hastily
absolve me of Fluffy's death, even though it seems that I could not do otherwise.
In this case, I did not kill the squirrel only because I could not do otherwise (the
actual event "Nick killed 'Fluffy' comes about in part because I really wanted to kill Fluffy).
To quote Frankfurt,
The following may all be true: there were circumstances that made it impossible for a
person to avoid doing something; these circumstances actually played a role in
bringing about that he did it, so that it is correct to say that he did it because he could
not have done otherwise; the person really wanted to do what he did; he did it because
it was what he really wanted to do, so that it is not correct to say that he did what he
did only because he could not have done otherwise. Under these conditions, the person
may well be morally responsible for what he has done. 7
This quote motivates an even more interesting claim. Notice that he states that it may be true
that "these circumstances actually played a role in bringing about that he did it." Frankfurt
thinks that the an agent can be held responsible, even if the circumstances which make it
impossible for him to do otherwise also playa role in bringing about that he commits the act.
He makes this argument in order to account for the fact that causal determinism does playa
role in our action, stating, "For if it was causally determined that a person perform a certain
action, then it will be true that the person performed it because ofthose causal determinants.,,8

Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal ofPhilosophy 66, no. 23
(1969): 839.
8 Frankfm1 838.
7
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But this is not sufficient for Frankfurt to account for why we act as we do, because when we
accept the excuse "I did it because I could not do otherwise ... "
It is because we assume that we are being told more than the statement strictly and
literally conveys. We understand the person who offers the excuse to mean that he did
what he did only because he was unable to do otherwise, or only because he had to do
it. And we understand him to mean, more particularly, that when he did what he did it
was not because that was what he really wanted to do. 9

The last series of italics are my own and placed there to emphasize the point that even if
Frankfurt is not concerned with our intentions, it definitely seeins that he cares a great deal
about 1) whether we wanted to commit the act, and 2) whether that want is a reason for the

It may well be that, while on my squirrel hunting trip, I see Fluffy and I am about to

tum the wheel to kill him, when the wheel locks and changes the car's direction to point
toward the squirrel just as I tum the steering wheel towards the squirrel; I may be held
morally responsible because I did not hit it only because I could not do otherwise. The fact
that the steering problem changes the car's direction is not the only reason why I hit the
squirrel, due to the fact that I was also on a squirrel hunting trip. The fact that the steering
malfunction does the work for me may be irrelevant: "When a fact is in this way irrelevant to
the problem of accounting for a person's action, it seems quite gratuitous to assign it any
weight in the assessment of his moral responsibility."l1 This, however, is likely too strong a
reading of Frankfurt; it does seem rather important to him that the possible intervening factors
do not actually intervene, as in the first case where the steering wheel locks but does not tum.
Nevertheless, Frankfurt seems to care a great deal about why we commit our acts: "Why
should the fact [that the action was unavoidable] be considered in reaching a moral judgment
Frankfurt 838.
Frankfu11 838.
11
Frankfurt 837.

9

10
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concerning the person when it does not help in any way to understand either what made him
act as he did or what, in other circumstances, he might have done?,,12 Frankfurt may not be
appealing to intention, but it is difficult to see what else it is that he could be blaming the
agent other than some kind of intentional state. It seems that that he is at least appealing to
motivation when he considers "what made him act" as important in making moral judgments
and that it "was what he really wanted to do."
One might argue that there are many flaws in my example, but there need not be those
same flaws in the example which Frankfurt provides us. To summarize: imagine that an agent
"Black" has the ability to control agent "Jones" (by what means let's not concern ourselves).
Let us also imagine that Mr. Jones is about to vote in a presidential election. As it so happens,
Mr. Black wants Mr. Jones to vote for candidate A and not to vote for candidate B. It also
happens that Black would rather not use his powers of control. So he will refrain from using it
unless Mr. Jones shows the inclination to vote for candidate B. If, on the other hand, Jones
seems inclined to vote for A, as Black wishes, then Mr. Black will do nothing. In this
situation Jones will vote for A; he cannot do otherwise. The only question is, "will he do it
with or without Mr. Black's intervention?" It seems that we would absolve Mr. Jones for
voting for candidate A if he does it because Mr. Black uses his mysterious power to force
Jones to do it. But, on the other hand, Frankfurt points out, if Mr. Jones voting for candidate
A is not the result of Black forcing him to do so, we do not absolve him even though he could

not do otherwise.
If Mr. Black never has to intervene in order to accomplish the event "Mr. Jones votes
for candidate A", why would we absolve Jones? It seems that he intends the act. In other
words, it is not the case that he did only because he could not do otherwise; he did it for some
12

Frankfurt 837.
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other reason. If we imagine ourselves in any number of situations in which we view an agent
who chooses to commit an act and willfully commits it, we seem disinclined to absolve the
agent even if the world was such that it would have prevented him or her from doing anything
else.
Someone opposing Frankfurt may argue that this cannot be correct; to hold an agent
responsible for an event that he or she cannot avoid committing is ludicrous, as it will force us
to hold agents responsible for events beyond their control willy-nilly. This horribly
misconstrues Frankfurt's argument. In a great many cases, when we are inclined to absolve an
agent for an event which he could not avoid, the agent commits the act only because he could
not have done otherwise and not simply because he could not avoid it. Jones, for example,
does not do as he does only because he could not do otherwise; he does what he does also
because he wanted to vote for candidate A. Frankfurt absolves the agent if the act was
committed only because he could not have done otherwise. He states, "He will not be morally
responsible for what he has done ifhe did it only because he could not have done otherwise,
even if what he did was something he really wanted to do.,,13 So we cannot hold an agent
responsible for actions outside of his control, even ifhe really wants the event to take place. If
the "really wanting" plays no role in the event coming about-the want must be causally
efficacious. This likely does not mean that "wanting to commit the act" is particularly special
to Frankfurt, but only that the want is evidence to the fact that the agent acted for more reason
than just because he could not do otherwise-and so he is not immediately absolved.

13

Frankfurt, HalTY G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The lournal of Philosophy 66, no.
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Frankfurt states that if "he did it because it was what he really wanted to do, ... it is not correct
to say that he did what he did only because he could not have done otherwise."

14

So, by Frankfurt's reasoning, desire for an event to come about is insufficient by itself
for blame; there must be a factor which makes it so that he acts as he does, but because of
some other additional factor such as because he really wanted it to occur. So an agent
completely under another agent's control would not be held responsible, even ifhe was really
enjoying what the controlling agent was making him do, because the actual instantiation of
the act can be described as such that he commits it only because he could not do otherwise;
his intentional states play no actual role in the instantiation of the event and so he is not
blamed for it. What actually matters to Frankfurt is that, if the event comes to pass as a result
of something an agent does, and that "something" is more than just because he could not do
otherwise, then he can be held responsible.
This seems to explain why, for example, if an agent's life is threatened by some other
agent, and must, in order to stay alive, commit some morally appalling act, we absolve the
threatened agent. His cry is one of "I did it only because I had no choice." We absolve him, it
seems, because the act was committed not because he wanted it, but because he saw himself
as having no options and because that lack of options is the only reason why he committed it.
Let us consider a scenario in which, on the other hand, another agent (let's call him Jason)
attacks me while I am on my way home to kill my kitten. Jason says to me as he pulls out a
deadly weapon, "Sir, I am forcing you, by virtue of threatening your life, to kill your kitten
when you get home." If my reply is, "Funny thing, Jason, I was actually on my way home to
do just that," and his reply is, "Ok, cool. But seriously, if you don't do it, I'll make you do it,"
14

Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal ofPhilosophy 66, no. 23
(1969): p. 839.
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I should not be absolved-even though I cannot do otherwise! Despite the fact that I could not
do otherwise (as I will either do it by my own will, or be forced to do it), it seems that many
readers would blame me for the murder of my kitten, regardless of my lack of choice, because
my lack of choice plays no role-but my intention, in this case, does. In other words, my
wanting to commit the act is the cause-it is why the event comes about.
Now, once again, Frankfurt's example is a much cleaner one than mine because
removes, or at least appears to remove, choice from the equation. My kitten-killer example
most likely leaves room for philosophers to argue over whether or not I had a choice to kill
my kitten or not, etc. However, if one examines Frankfurt's argument, one can see that it
suffers from no such flaw. Jones knows nothing concerning his lack of options, even though
he will vote for candidate A no matter what his original inclination. Nevertheless, to absolve
him for an act which required no intervention on Black's behalf seems unreasonable. If Jones
wants to commit the act, wills the event into existence, intends it, and then commits itregardless of the fact that he was going to do it no matter what-he seems morally
responsible.
Why, in this case, is Jones not absolved? It is for this reason that I introduced my
kitten-case. What it teases out is that that we do not absolve Jones because there is a factor
independent of his lack of an alternative possibility-namely, intention-which is the reason
why the act is committed. So despite his lack of control, we blame Jones, because he did not
do it only because he could not do otherwise. In this case, the reason why Jones does as he
does is not because he could not do otherwise but because he wants to do as he does. Recall
that wanting an event to come into being is not sufficient for blaming the agent, but in this
case his wanting to vote for A is the reason why he votes for A. The question then becomes,
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"But what if Jones' intentions were such that he could not want to do otherwise? Do we still
hold him responsible?" In this case, Jones votes for A because it is his intention to do sobecause he wants to vote for A, but what if he wants to vote for A or intends to vote for A
only because he cannot intend or want otherwise? Is the answer as simple as he is morally
responsible for voting for A but not responsible for wanting or intending to vote for A? I will
take this concern up in the next chapter.

Ch. 3 Prima-Facie Counter-Examples
It seems to be a fair assumption that Frankfurt believes an agent can still be held

responsible despite a lack of alternative possibilities due to the fact that some other factor,
such as his intention, may be the reason why he acts as he does. In this case, it is the agent's
intention that we should actually be concerned with in judging an agent because the fact that
he could not do otherwise plays no role in why he commits the act. To quote Frankfurt, "The
fact that a person could not have avoided doing something is a sufficient condition of his
having done it. But, as some of my examples show, this fact may play no role whatever in the
explanation of why he did it.,,15 If an agent performs an act intentionally, regardless of
whether or not he can do otherwise, he should be held responsible for it, because the event is
the same one which he intended and it is brought about not because he could not do otherwise
but, in this case, because he intended it.
It seems that in cases where the agent cannot do otherwise, the only things which

belong to the agent which can help to bring about an event are things internal to the agent, as
the external is not something under his control. It seems that it is largely these internal
events-intentions-which can act as a locus of responsibility for Frankfurt, even in cases
15

Frankfurt 836.
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where an agent cannot do otherwise. In other words, what Frankfurt is blaming the agent for
cannot just be because he brought about the event-otherwise agents who commit an event
only because they could not do otherwise would also be morally accountable-but because he
intended to bring the event about and his intention is a reason why it did come about.
Assuming that I am correct, and it is true that Frankfurt believes that intentionality is
the locus of responsibility in these cases, then one wonders if Frankfurt is providing us with
true counter-examples. In other words, is his example one in which the agent truly cannot do
otherwise? It seems that the answer is dependent on whether one considers the ability to
intend otherwise an "ability to do otherwise." If one does not, if the argument that "the ability
to do otherwise" omits for some reason the ability to intend otherwise, then it seems that I
have no case. Let us assume though, that intending is similar to other events in the world in
that it is not mystical or spiritual-instead, intentions are events and, as such, the result of
causal factors. If this assertion regarding intentions is true, then it seems that Frankfurt's
examples, at least as originally presented to us, are not actually counter examples.
In the case of Black and Jones, there is no reason to believe that Jones is restricted

from intending otherwise. If this is true, then the incompatibilist may argue that Frankfurt's
examples only seem to work because they have the appearance of situations in which the
agent cannot do otherwise, but, in fact, the agent can do otherwise ... he can intend otherwise,
and in making that choice force Black to intervene. If, then, Black does intervene and forces
Jones to vote for A, then Jones will have voted for A only because he could not do otherwise.
Thereby, according to Frankfurt, he cannot be morally responsible. Perhaps Frankfurt intends
that Jones cannot intend to do otherwise, in other words his choice is such that he has no
alternative possibilities, but then, to quote Stewart Goetz,
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Thus, any appearance of a causal over-detennination involving Black's device [the
device which can force Jones to vote] is illusory because, reiterating a point already
made, without the obtaining of casual detenninism in the actual sequence of events,
Black's device cannot prevent Jones from making an alternative choice. And with the
obtaining of causal detenninism in the actual sequence of events, the question about
the compatibility of detenninism and moral responsibility has simply been begged
against the incompatibilist. 16
What Goetz is pointing out is that if Black cannot prevent Jones from intending otherwise,
then Jones has alternative possibilities. On the other hand, if Jones cannot even intend to do
otherwise, then it seems that Frankfurt is not just presenting us with a case of an agent who
cannot do otherwise in regards to one event, but, instead, a case in which Jones is a victim of
causal detenninism-all of his actions, and intentional states, are such that he cannot do
otherwise. If this is the case, and Frankfurt is presenting us with a case of causal detenninism,
then his ability to undennine PAP is severely limited. Conversely, if this is a case which does
not assume causal detenninism, but, instead, is only a case in which an agent lacks alternative
possibilities, then the fact that we all agree that Jones is blameworthy acts as a counterexample. If Goetz is right and Frankfurt is not just removing alternative possibilities, but he is
also imbedding causal detenninism into the case, then he is only reiterating the old
compatibilist thesis-that our intuitions are such that we can blame agents in a causally
detennined world and it need not be irrational and so is begging the question, says Goetz.17
Conversely, it may be that Frankfurt is not presenting us with a situation in which we
are actually blaming the agent when he cannot do otherwise. We are blaming Jones, the
incompatibilist may argue, for not intending as he should and he could have intended
otherwise; therefore, it is not irrational to blame Jones for not intending otherwise. This seems
to work clearly in the kitten-killer example, as the concern in the first place seems to be my
Stewart Goetz. "Frankturt-Style Counter Examples and Begging the Question." Midwest Studies in Philosophy
29, no. (2005): p. 88.
17 Goetz p. 88.
16
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intention to kill the kitten. The advocate ofPAP can argue that we would not blame the agent
in the same way if! had some sort of kitten-killing disorder which prevents me from being
able to intend other than killing kittens. This is because, so says Goetz, we absolve agents in
cases in which they cannot do otherwise not just because of the truth of PAP but because "he
is not free to choose otherwise because of causal determinism.

,,18

In other words, PAP is

indicative of causal determinism, and that is why we absolve agents who do not have
alternative possibilities. In cases in which agents do not have alternative possibilities, but the
world is not causally determined, as in Frankfurt's cases, the agent can still be held
responsible. Goetz's point is that if Frankfurt attempts to preserve his counter-examples and
restricts Jones' intentions so that he cannot intend otherwise, he is not just introducing a lack
of alternative possibilities into the example, but he is also introducing causal determinism.
Regardless of whether Goetz is correct, there certainly seems to be a tacit agreement that if an
agent's actions are such that he cannot do otherwise, and his intentions are also such that he
cannot do otherwise, then he cannot be held responsible. Frankfurt supposedly counters this
claim by presenting us with a case in which an agent cannot do otherwise and is still
blameworthy, but this does not necessarily attack PAPas Goetz describes it because
Frankfurt's examples are such that it seems that Jones can intend to do otherwise.
If the Frankfurtian restricts even Jones' intentions, he can present us with a situation in
which Jones is being blamed for his intentions as they do result in the event coming about, but
they cannot be otherwise. Imagine that if Jones shows an inclination to intend otherwise than
to vote as Black wishes, Black will intervene and force Jones to intend as Black sees fit. This
seems to solve the problem until one realizes that the incompatibilist will simply take another
step back and argue that Jones can still do otherwise in that he can show the inclination that
18

Goetz p. 88.
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will force Black to change his intentions. Nevertheless, if Jones can show the inclination to
vote otherwise, it does not seem that we are dealing with a case in which Jones truly cannot
do otherwise.
The Frankfurtian may again counter by stating that these inclinations are also such that
Black can control them ifhe wishes, and it seems that the advocate ofPAP respond as he did
before, by taking a step back and blaming the agent for whatever it is he did that was not
under Black's control. So, what if we simply move this sequence back all the way? Ifwe
assert that there has never been any mental event that Jones has had which Black could not
change to suit his will, do we still blame Jones for his actions? The difficulty here is the
realization that Jones, now, by definition, cannot even conceive of thinking other than Black
wills. The advocate ofP AP is likely to assert that when we blame Jones for not intending as
he should, the only reason why we can blame him is by blaming him for being born an agent
who has never had the inclination to do anything that would cause Black to intervene. This
seems ridiculous, what reason do we have to blame him for being born as he is? Even by
Frankfurt's definition, Jones would be born as he is only because he could not do otherwise,
and so he would be absolved. The dialectic develops in the following way:
1.

Frankfurt asserts that he presents a case in which PAP is false because Jones
does not have alternative possibilities and, yet, our intuitions are such that
we do blame Jones.

2.

The advocate ofPAP agrees that Jones does seem blameworthy, but notes
that this does not act as evidence that PAP is false because Jones does have
an alternate possibility-he can intend otherwise.
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3.

Frankfurt responds that the case can be altered so that Jones cannot intend
otherwise and, yet, still does as he does without Black's intervention and so
he is blameworthy and lacks alternative possibilities.

4.

The advocate of PAP argues that Black's ability to restrict Jones' intentions
is based on Black's ability to observe Jones' inclinations to do otherwise, so
Jones still has an alternative possibility in that he can force Black to
intervene by demonstrating a one of these inclinations.

5.

Frankfurt replies by arguing that Black can also restrict Jones' inclinations
such that he cannot, even in the smallest way, begin to form the desire to do
otherwise. Nevertheless, Black never has to use this power, and so Jones is
morally responsible.

6.

According to Goetz, Frankfurt has now embedded causal determinism in the
case and, therefore, to assert the truth of compatibilism in the case is to beg
the question.

Frankfurt's defender is likely to respond to claim #6 by arguing that Frankfurt does not assert
that compatibilism is true, but only that PAP is false. But, if this is the case, Frankfurt is still
asserting that PAP is false by using the example of a causally-determined world. So Frankfurt
may be accomplishing something amazing, he is not only proving that alternative possibilities
are not necessary for an agent to be held morally responsible, but that an agent can rationally
be held responsible for his actions in a causally determined world. The question is of course,
what is it we are holding the agent responsible for? We cannot blame Jones for actually not
doing otherwise, as doing otherwise in this case is a physical impossibility. We also cannot
blame him for not intending otherwise, as this is also a physical impossibility. Jones, in this
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case, is largely being held responsible for being an agent who has never even had the
inclination to do otherwise than Black wills; essentially, he is being blamed for being born the
way he is, which is an event over which he has no control.
The event "Jones was born such that he would never cause Black to intervene" is an
event for which Jones is in no way responsible. Moreover, notice, as causal determinism is
built into the case-all of Jones' actions are such that they as they are the direct and only
possible result of his previous actions and intentions. So, it seems that Jones is forced in a way
to do as he does. He does noJ just lack alternative possibilities; he must do as he does. At any
instance in which we blame Jones, we are blaming him for an event which was necessitated
by a previous event-not just one lacking alternative possibilities. And so it is the same with
every event which follows his birth (which is an event over which he has no control): every
event is one which is necessitated and, so one over which, it at least seems, he has no control.
I will return to this point later in this paper as Fischer attacks the assertion that Jones does not
have control. Frankfurt can, in this way dodge the bullet that he is not actually presenting
counter-examples. He can assert that Jones has absolutely no ability to do otherwise even
regarding Jones' intentions or inclinations, but this can have significant consequences.

Ch. 4 Is Frankfurt Begging the Question?
Unfortunately, the argument that Frankfurt begs the question is not so easily
dismissed. As David Widerker points out, Frankfurt's case is supposed to be one which does
not assume causal determinism. 19 To quote Frankfurt, "There may be circumstances in which

19

David Widerker. "Libertariansim and Frankfurt's Attack on Alternative Possibilities." The Philosophical
Review 104, no. 2 (1995): 248.
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a person performs some action which although they make it impossible for him to avoid
performing that action, they in no way bring it about that he performs it.,,2o Frankfurt's first
step is to try to prove that there can be cases of a lack of alternate possibilities which are not
also causally deterministic. If causal determinism is already embedded in the case, then he is
attempting to demonstrate that an agent can lack alternative possibilities in a non-determined
world but doing so by providing us with an agent who is causally determined. Frankfurt's
case is intended to be one which demonstrates the falsity ofPAP without assuming causal
determinism. The example of Jones is intended to be such that the events leading up to Jones'
action do not necessitate that Jones do as he does; instead, it is supposed to be Black's ability
to force Jones to act in certain ways which removes alternative possibilities. David Widerker
argues that these inclincations, which he terms "flickers of freedom" produce the following
dilemma for Frankfurt: either the inclinations that Jones exhibits (let's call their summation
"F") are something which can result in Jones doing otherwise or they are not. If Jones having
F is something which can result in his doing otherwise, it is hard to see how Jones does not
have alternative possibilities, even though the actuation of the event is blocked offto him by
Black. On the other hand, ifF is not something which can result in Jones being able to do
otherwise, then Jones' act is necessitated regardless ofBlack's intervention. 21 In other words,
Jones cannot do otherwise than he does, not because of Black's ability, but because of causal
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David Widerker. "Libertariansim and Frankfurt's Attack on Alternative Possibilities." The Philosophical
Review 104, no. 2 (1995): 248.

21 David Widerker. "Libertariansim and Frankfurt's Attack on Alternative Possibilities." The Philosophical
Review 104, no. 2 (1995): 247-250.
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detenninism. This is a key problem for Frankfurt capitalized on by Robert Kane, Al Mele, and
David Widerker and one which even worries Fischer.
It seems that in order for Frankfurt to remove all alternative possibilities from his

example he must create a case in which Jones acts are necessitated and so he lacks alternative
possibilities not because of Black but because of causal detenninism. As Goetz points out,
Frankfurt is then creating the illusion of a case in which Jones lacks alternative possibilities
because of Black, but, in reality, he lacks alternative possibilities because of causal
detenninism. Specifically, the dilemma is this: either Jones can exhibit flickers of freedom
which can result in him doing otherwise, or he cannot. If the flicker can result in him doing
otherwise, then Jones has alternative possibilities. If it cannot result in his doing otherwise,
then Jones' actions are necessitated, no matter what inclinationslflickers he exhibits. By
describing Jones as a character whose flickers of freedom cannot result in him doing
otherwise, we eliminate the need for Black as a factor to restrict Jones' actions; Jones cannot
even conceive of doing otherwise, and so all of his actions are more than just detennined, they
are necessitated.
If Jones' actions are such that they are necessitated by causal detenninism, Frankfurt
does not present us with a case whereby that which restricts Jones ability to act (which
Frankfurt claims is Mr. Black) is not the reason why Jones acts; instead, Frankfurt presents a
situation in which that which makes it impossible for Jones to do otherwise (causal
detenninism) does bring about Jones' decision. In other words, if causal detenninism is built
into the case, then Jones acts only because causal detenninism necessitates that he does, and,
so, even by Frankfurt's own lights, Jones may be absolved because Jones acts only because he

cannot do otherwise (because his actions are necessitated by causal detenninism.)
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One might argue that Jones also acts because he wants to act as he does, so it is not a
case of Jones acting only because he cannot do otherwise. One should keep in mind, though,
that his wanting do as he does is also causally necessitated and more importantly, because
Jones cannot do otherwise, his want is not something which could bring about him doing
otherwise. His wanting to do as he does is not a reason why the event comes about, because
regardless of his want, the event will come about. One may argue that in the actual sequence
of events (the one in which Jones votes for A), Jones wanting to vote for A is the reason why
he votes for A, but this intentional state determines that Jones acts as he does, so it
undermines Frankfurt's claim that he provides an argument in which that which restricts
Jones' alternatives does not also bring about the event. This is a deep concern because if
Jones' actions are causally determine, therefore Jones is compelled to act the way he does. An
agent who is forced to commit an act is generally morally absolved, even by Frankfurt.
There is a significant question regarding whether I am giving Frankfurt's critics too
much credit. How is it that he is begging the question, as opposed to simply stipulating that
the world can exist in a certain way and then pointing out that we can still be held morally
responsible in it even if the world did exist in that way? The conditional supported by PAP is
"If an agent is morally responsible (P), then he has alternate possibilities (q)"; what Frankfurt
is pointing out, though, is that the lack of alternative possibilities does not entail the negation
of moral responsibility. The conditional is not true. Frankfurt could point out in response to
Goetz that regardless of whether or not the lack of alternative possibilities is due to causal
determinism, agent Black, or any other reason, his example is still one in which the agent does
not have alternate possibilities and, yet, we still hold him responsible.
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What Frankfurt's defender is missing, though, is that for Frankfurt's argument to
work, that which restricts Jones' actions cannot also be the reason why he commits the act, or
else at the very best, we have an example of an agent who acted as he did only because he
could not do otherwise. Consider the following example: imagine that Mr. Black is so
invested in the election of candidate A that he does not allow Jones to commit the act "Jones
votes for candidate A" without interference. In other words, Mr. Black is so desperate to see
the event come to pass that he preempts Jones' already pre-existing inclination to vote for A
and uses his power to make Jones vote for A. Notice, there is a counter-factual in this case
which states, "had Mr. Black not forced Jones to vote for candidate A, Jones would have
voted for A of his own volition." However, despite the counter-factual, we do not blame Jones
in this case. At the very least, Frankfurt does not blame Jones in this case, because Jones
wanting to vote for A alone is insufficient for blame. The only reason why Jones acts is

because his action was caused by Black
Do not confuse this with the counter-factual that Jones would have done it even
without Black's interference. In the actual sequence of events, Jones acts only because of
Black's power, and it is this actual-sequence with which Frankfurt is concerned. Moreover,
there seems to be a very good reason to absolve Jones in this case: we regularly want events
to come about over which we have no control and so we should not be held responsible for
them. So, what we come to realize is that if Jones lacks control over the act, then he must be
absolved-by Frankfurt's own lights.
I am not convinced that begging the question is necessarily the best way to describe
the way the Frankfurt's argument fails; nevertheless, if Frankfurt removes all possibilities of
flickers of freedom, then Jones' action is now necessitated because the actual-sequence is
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such that it makes him do as he does. The only reason why Jones acts in Frankfurt's example,
in the actual sequence, is because of causal determinism. Recall that if we remove from Jones
the ability to be moved by a flicker of freedom to do otherwise, then we can also remove from
the case Mr. Black's possible interference and Jones will still lack the ability to do otherwise;
Jones act is necessitated not because Mr. Black may interfere but because his actions are
necessitated by causal determinism. The key point here is that Black is not necessary in the
case to make it such that Jones cannot do otherwise, because Jones' flickers of freedoms are
such that they cannot result in his doing otherwise. So, Jones' actions are such that the same
thing that restricts Jones' actions is the same thing which causes him to act.
For Frankfurt to effectively demonstrate the falsity ofPAP, this cannot be the case;
Jones cannot be forced to act in this way-if he is, then he meets Frankfurt's criterion that he
acts only because he could not have done otherwise and is therefore absolved. I suspect that
philosophers like Goetz assert that Frankfurt is begging the question because Frankfurt is no
longer presenting us an example in which Jones is only lacking alternative possibilities, he is
presenting us with an example in which Jones is both lacking alternative possibilities and his
actions are caused by that which restricts is ability to do otherwise. There is, therefore, little or
no difference between Frankfurt's case and the case in which Black actually does cause Jones
to. act.
If this is the case, then it may not be that Frankfurt is actually begging the question
(because he is not embedding the truth of the conclusion in the premises) if we view his
example as the positing of a scenario in which Jones lacks alternatives but may still be
morally responsible. Nevertheless, he is presenting us with a case in which it seems that
Jones' action is not caused by that which restricts his actions-but this is an illusion. Once we
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see past the illusion, we realize that this is actually a case in which Jones' act is caused by the
same thing that restricts him. So the description of Jones' act is significantly different in a
world in which causal detenninism is embedded and his flickers of freedom cannot motivate
him to even try to do otherwise. In Frankfurt's initial example, the event "Jones votes for A"
can be described as "Jones votes for A because he wants to vote for A." In a case in which
Jones' wants are irrelevant to his actions, "Jones votes for A" must be described as "Jones
votes for A"because it is necessitated that he votes for A." It cannot be said that he votes for
A because he wanted to, because that want is irrelevant to the actual sequence of events in a
way that it is not in Frankfurt's original example.
It maybe argued that Jones' desire, in this case, is part of the causal chain and, so,

even in the case where Jones' flickers of freedom are restricted, he acts because he wants to
and because of causal detenninism. This claim leads to problematic conclusions. For example,
consider a case in which Jones does not want to vote for A but Black uses his power to change
Jones' mental state so that Jones does want to vote for A. This case would then also be one in
which Jones is still responsible, despite Black's interference, because Jones' wanting the
event to take place was part of the causal chain. What we begin to see here is that Frankfurt's
account is missing something essential-namely, control. Jones' lack of control over his
wants in both the case of Jones lacking flickers of freedom which can cause him to act
differently, and the case where Black changes Jones' desires, can provide a reason why Jones
is morally absolved, even though his desire is part of the causal chain.

Ch. 5 Revisions to the Counter-Examples
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It is likely that Frankfurt does not intend that Jones' intentions are free. Jones' ability
to intend otherwise would make it such that his counter-examples are not cases in which the
agent cannot truly do otherwise. We should consider his examples, then, with the idea that he
does not want to appeal to intention in mind. However, the analysis may then go something
like this: these are not true counter-examples because Jones did intend to vote for the
candidate, despite his lack of alternative possibilities, and it is for this that we are blaming
him. Moreover, he had the ability to intend otherwise, so your examples are not true counterexamples." The Frankfurtian may then reply that it is a mistake to care about intentions
because the counter-examples still may hold even if the agent's intentions are determined. We
are blaming the agent because factors of his own, without interference, result in the action. If
the Frankfurtian asserts that the counter-examples remain situations in which an agent cannot
do otherwise-and, therefore, the agent does not even have flickers of freedom-but still
wishes to maintain that alternative possibilities are not necessary for responsibility, he may do
so. He can assert that Jones cannot desire or intend otherwise, but we still blame him for
voting for candidate A, not because his intention is somehow exempt from constraint, but
because intention, regardless of alternative possibilities, is the locus of moral responsibility.
So the Frankfurtian will have demonstrated that the lack of alternative possibilities plays no
role in why the agent acts. His intentions, regardless of their origin, are what we blame him
for; so, if those intentions result in the act then we can blame Jones-regardless of the .
necessitated nature of Jones' actions and intentions.
The Frankfurtian could argue that it would be irrational to ignore the fact that our
intuitions tell us that Jones is morally responsible--even though he is living out a causally
determined sequence. The Frankfurtian can avoid the charge that he is begging the question
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by pointing out that we still are intuitively compelled to hold Jones morally responsible, even
though we know that he exists in a causally determined universe. His example then acts not as
a counter-example in which he has definitely proven that a) Jones does not have alternative
possibilities, b) Jones is responsible, and c) that which restricts Jones' actions does not force
him to act. It acts more as a kind of intuition pump which motivates us to agree with Frankfurt
because, upon reviewing the case, we agree that a) Jones does not have alternative
possibilities and b) our intuitions tell us that he is still responsible, because c) that which
compels him to act is not necessarily a coercive factor, as it aligns perfectly with all of Jones'
intentions. He states clearly that, "The principle of alternate possibilities is false" and argues
for the truth of Jones' moral responsibility because in a possible world exactly like his case,
but without the existence of Black, Jones is still held responsible. The addition of Blackwithout the interference of Black--does not change the fact that Jones is morally responsible
because Black does nothing.
However, either Jones does have alternative possibilities in the world in which Black
does nothing because Jones has, at the very least, flickers of freedom, or b) Jones' flickers of
freedom are such that they cannot result in Jones doing otherwise, so Jones will do as he does
regardless of Black. This world is causally determined. In this second case, Frankfurt's
argument is decimated.
A response to the argument that Frankfurt begs the question by creating a world in
which Jones is compelled to act as he does may be that we treat Frankfurt's examples as
intuition pumps which, in the end, do not demonstrate so much what we think about
alternative possibilities, but, instead, what we think about intentions. The case becomes one in
which the agent cannot do anything other than what he does, and what we realize is that we
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don't really care about that, we care about what the agent actually intended. For this to suffice
though, we may commit ourselves to the belief that it really doesn't matter if the agent can't
intend otherwise. We assert that intention is what we blame people for, and whether or not
they have the ability to intend anything else, we will continue to hold them responsible
because of it.
The power behind Frankfurt's argument-that many of us share the intuition that
Jones is still responsible-seems to dissipate when we take the argument to this extreme.
Jones, when we remove his ability to even think in any other way, seems to become
something of a charity case. He is deficient in an essential way and unable to engage in fully
human adult functioning. He is an agent in which all of his beliefs, feelings, intentions,
choices, motivations, etc. are such that they cannot be otherwise. Ifhe believes that he
actually has the ability to change any of those things, he is delusional. There are external
factors which would prevent this change; even worse, as he lacks the ability to produce
flickers of freedom which can result in him even intending to do otherwise, he cannot indulge
any thought or feeling which is not determined.
A Frankfurtian could just reply that as what we are trying to address is the problem of

compatibility with determinism: then Jones is really not an exception at all-as we are all, if
determined, unable to intend otherwise. In a fully determined world, agents cannot intend
other than as they do. So Jones is no less part of the moral community than any of the rest of
us; he, therefore, cannot be exempt. But, this may not necessarily be true for Jones as it seems
that Jones lives in a special kind of determined world: Jones' world is fated such that no
matter what he does, the events will take place, whereas, even in a causally determined world,
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it seems that agents can be authors of the future; they may lack the ability to do other than
they do, but that need not mean that events will come to pass regardless of what they do.
Even so, if we commit Jones' actions to being causally determined, this, once again,
leads the Frankfurtian into the problem as described by Goetz. If the situation he provides us
is one which is causally determined, then it seems that he is begging the question. If Jones
lacks alternative possibilities, and causal determinism is built into the case such that Jones'
actions are determined, it seems that Frankfurt is doing nothing more than stating that despite
causal determinism, an agent can be held morally accountable-which was his initial claim:
that PAP is false and, therefore, he begs the question-as he has not provided us with a case
in which that which restricts Jones' alternatives is also not that which causes him to do as he
does. He must be able to provide us with a reason why, in this causally determined world as
he has described it, Jones is still morally responsible. Ifhe is compelled to act-and it seems
that Jones is compelled ifhis actions are causally determined-then he is absolved, even in
Frankfurt's account. Even worse, it seems that the kind of determinism which necessitated
Jones' actions is even more stringent than that which would necessitate the actions of agents
in a causally determined world.
Many compatibilists, argue that the crux of the counter-example is that an agent may,
in every possible way, be unable to intend, desire, or think otherwise, but, if there is no actual
intervention, the agent is still held responsible because it is the agent's unmolested brain states
that result in his committing the act. If Jones' flickers of freedom are such that they cannot
bring it about that Jones does otherwise, then Jones' actions are necessitated, and not by
Black, but by causal determinism. Even so, many of us, when presented even with the most
stringent case of Jones' actions being causally determined, believe that Jones is responsible
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due to the fact that Jones is not interfered with by Black.What the compatabilists do is assert
that there is a difference between this super-restricted case and the case which I presented
earlier of Jones being forced by Black to change his intention. They want to assert that even in
the super-stringent case, Jones has a kind of control that he does not if Black actually
interferes and changes his intentional states. So, it is this unimpeded intention which actually
matters.
The argument may then continue in the following vein: Jones cannot do otherwise, in
order to maintain the integrity of the counter examples, he also cannot intend otherwise-so
whatever it is that we are blaming him for, it is not due to his ability to do otherwise. What
Frankfurt's examples do for us, then, regardless of causal determinism, is help us locate the
locus of moral responsibility using our intuition. Frankfurt's examples may, despite the
problems of assuming casual determinism, remain quite powerful because, from our limited
perspective, they help us determine how to ascribe praise and blame when dealing with actual
problems in the world. The Frankfurtian counter-examples then act as a kind of evidence for
what we actually consider to be the locus of responsibility-namely, intention.
Given this reply, when considering his examples there seem to be at least two options
for blaming agents. We can blame them for their consequences (which they cannot do other
than in a causally determined universe) or blame them for their intentions (which they also
cannot do other than-unless we want to allow them a flicker of freedom, which then makes it
a case in which the agent actually can do otherwise). The question becomes, "if alternative
possibilities do not matter why should we defer to intentions? What is so special about
intention?"
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Ch. 6 Intention vs. Consequence
To this point I have argued the following: Frankfurt tells us that alternative
possibilities are not necessary in order to hold an agent morally responsible. He does that by
providing counter-examples that are supposed to be cases in which an agent cannot do
otherwise, and yet we hold the agent responsible. My first contention is that these examples
are not cases in which the agent cannot do otherwise, as it seems that he is pointing us
towards blaming the agent for his intentions. These intentions are not, in Frankfurt's
examples, described as things which are restricted in the same way as are the agent's actions.
If it is true that Frankfurt does allow for the agent to intend otherwise, it seems that it is not
the case in which his examples demonstrate that an agent can be held responsible even though
the agent cannot do otherwise-as he can intend otherwise.
It may be that the Frankfurtian can reply by arguing that by "can do otherwise," we do

not mean he can intend otherwise-we are only referring to actions which take place out in
the external world. If this is the case, though, why worry about absolving the agent when he
or she acts "only because he could not do otherwise"? It seems that if we absolve Jones for
voting for candidate A because Black forces him to, it has to be because there is something
different between him and the Jones who votes for candidate A because he wants to do so.
Either way, the act itself is not instantiated in the world any differently; whatever it is that we
are blaming or absolving Jones for it must be something going on inside his head.
The Frankfurtian may argue that even though intentions do count, the examples still
work even if the intentions are such that the agent cannot intend otherwise. But, if he or she
grants that Frankfurtian counter-examples still work in a world in which causal determinism is
true, then what difference is there between intention and consequence? Intentions are things
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which are detennined; consequences are things which are detennined; yet, for some reason,
we should absolve the agent for an act ifhe commits it only because he could not do
otherwise? How is that agent, who we are absolving, different from the agent who commits
the act because he wanted to commit the act? Granted, it might be something as simple as one
agent is displaying traits which we praise (not wanting to commit bad acts) and the other is
displaying traits we condemn (wanting to commit a bad act). This does not resolve the
problem though, because it seems that if the only difference between them is that one
commits a bad act of intention, and the other commits a good act of intention, we have still
not detennined what is special about intention. Moreover, as consequences are much easier to
measure and observe, if neither intention nor consequence is something particularly special,
why not just blame agents for consequences and be done with it? As opposed to trying to find
out what was actually in the agents head we can just blame them for the bad acts that we can
actually observe.
It may be argued though that there is something special about intention: an agent has

much less control over his consequences than he does over his intentions. For instance, he can
commit actions for which the consequences are the result of pure luck. Given this, perhaps
what we are actually interested in is not intention at all, but, instead, control. Jones is
absolved, if Black intervenes, because Jones lacks control, he is not absolved if Black does
not intervene because he maintains control. This discussion brings us to the work of perhaps
the most influential philosopher to address the problem of Frankfurtian counter examplesFischer. It is his arguments which will be examined in Part II.
Although Fischer believes that Frankfurt's account points out something very
important about control, it does seem that Frankfurt, at least at some points in his writing,
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appeals to more that just the idea of control. Consider the fact that Frankfurt absolves and
agent ifhe commits the act only because he cannot do otherwise. But, it seems that this
certainly points us away from consequence as the locus of responsibility as we are focusing
on the cause and not the effect of the action. The difference between an agent who is absolved
and an agent who is not is whether or not he committed the action only because he could not
do otherwise, not because of how the events turned out. Frankfurt points us toward the
reasons why an agent acts. From this we can see that if an agent commits an act because he
wants to he can be held responsible for the act. Frankfurt is asserting that we should blame
agents for those reasons and regardless of whether the agent can do otherwise.
Having said this, there is at least one more good reason to assert that if Frankfurt is not
locating intention as the locus of moral responsibility, he should. Consider, that is seems that
his argument that an agent should be absolved "if he acted only because he could not do
otherwise" tells us that if any other fact acts as a reason why the agent acts he may be
considered responsible. It is intuitively plausible that Jones could act has he does because he
has been fed misinformation about candidate A and so believes that candidate A is truly best
person for the job, but had Jones known that candidate was actually a kitten-killer, for
example, he would never had voted for A. In this scenario, it is not the case that Jones votes
for A only because he could not do otherwise: he also votes for A because he has been led to
believe, mistakenly, that A is a good candidate. Nevertheless, we are likely to absolve Jones
in this case. So, it may well be that Jones acts for more reasons than only because he could not
do otherwise, and is still absolved. Considering Jones' intention, then, plays a very important
role, it acts to indicate cases in which the agent acts for additional factors for which we
consider him responsible, or it can act as in indicator that he acts for an additional factor
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which acts to absolve Jones. Contrary to what Fischer will tells us regarding control and
moral responsibility, I believe that what Frankfurt's argument does most effectively is
demonstrate that we are deeply invested in why the agent acts as he does and that our
allocation of moral responsibility largely revolves around the agent's intention.

Part II: Fischer and the Problem of Mr. Black
Ch. 7 Fischer's Solution to the Problem
Fischer rejects the sort of dilemma I presented in Part I-that either Frankfurt admits
that the agent can intend otherwise and so he actually does have alternative possibilities or he
restricts Jones' intentions, in which case he is assuming causal detenninism. He argues in
"Responsibility and Control :A Theory of Moral Responsibility" that the one hom of the
dilemma is only indicative of "flickers of freedom" which are insufficient to ground moral
responsibility and even if, in this particular case, there are alternative possibilities, this does
not mean that it is in principle impossible for one to develop Frankfurt-style cases in which
there are no robust alternative possibilities?2 So, Fischer is unmotivated by this dilemma, he
presents his own account for other reasons.
Fischer is motivated by the "Consequence Argument" as described by Peter Van
Inwagen?3 Essentially, the argument states that in a causally detennined universe all of our
behaviors are the result of the past in conjunction with the laws of nature. In such a world all
of our behaviors are, in essence, compulsory. Fischer describes it as follows:
Given the definition of causal detenninism, it follows that my current choice to
continue typing ... is entailed by true propositions about the past and laws of nature.
22 John Martin Fischer. "Compatibilism." Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p. 60.
23

Robert Kane. A Contempormy Introduction to Free Will. Fundamentals of Philosophy Series. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
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Thus, if I were free (just prior to my actual choice) to choose (and subsequently do)
otherwise, then I must have been free so to behave that the past would have been
different or the natural laws would have been different. But intuitively the past is
"fixed" and out of my control and so are the natural laws. I cannot now do anything
that is such that, if! were to do it, the past would have been different ... or the natural
laws would be different. It appears to follow that. .. I am never free to choose and do
otherwise. 24
Although Fischer recognizes the power of Van Inwagen's argument, he also recognizes that it
is by no means a settled matter. (As an aside it should be noted that in presenting his argument
for compatibilism-which he calls "semi-compatibilsm" due to his argument that freedom
does require alternative possibilities-he has no intention of providing support for the
Consequence Argument.) Instead, his purpose is simply to provide a way to demonstrate the
necessary conditions for moral responsibility regardless of whether the Consequence
Argument is sound. What is important to Fischer is that he provides an account of moral
responsibility in which we can be held accountable for our actions in the face of the fact that
the Consequence Argument seems to rule out the possibility that we are free to choose and to
do other than we do. This differs from Frankfurt's approach because Fischer will argue that
what actually matters is what kind of control the agent has, as opposed to Frankfurt's
argument that it is the reasons why the agent acts that matters. It is likely that there are cases
in which an agent acts only because he could not do otherwise and, therefore, be absolved by
Frankfurt and, yet, maintain the kind of control which Fischer argues is sufficient and
necessary for moral responsibility.
Fischer presents an account which relies heavily on a distinction he generates between
two kinds of control: there is regulative control and guidance control. Although regulative
control requires the ability to both prevent and bring about alternate sequences of events,

24
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guidance control only requires that the agent acts from his own reasons responsive
mechanism-there must be a possible world in which the agent can recognize and respond to
a reason to do otherwise. It is only guidance control that is necessary for moral responsibility.
Fischer states, "Guidance control, and not regulative control, is the control that is associated
with moral responsibility; that is, guidance control in itself... satisfies the freedom-relevant
condition of moral responsibility. If this is correct, then the indirect challenge to our moral
responsibility (based on the possible truth of causal determinism) can be sidestepped.,,25
According to Fischer, it is not the freedom implied by the ability to do otherwise which is the
locus of moral responsibility, but the freedom imbedded in the ability to bring about an event
through one's own reasons-responsive (subject to practical deliberation) mechanism.
Fischer states, "Recall that it is not enough for the proponent of the regulative control
requirement to identify just any sort of alternative possibility; rather, he needs to find an
alternative possibility that is sufficiently robust to ground attributions of moral responsibility,
given the regulative control picture.,,26 A flicker of freedom is too weak to ground attributions
of moral responsibility, according to Fischer, when it is clear that it is a flicker an agent could
have and, yet, sti11lack the necessary control for moral responsibility. Imagine a scenario in
which an agent is forced to act, and yet is allowed to raise his eyebrow as he pleases. He may
raise that eyebrow all he wants in support of the act and, yet, this alternative possibility, to
raise or not raise the eyebrow, is insufficient to blame him for the act he is forced to commit.
In order to be a robust the alternative possibility must be such that if it does come about, the
agent would do otherwise than he would have if it did not come about.

25 Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.

Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 34.
26 John Martin Fischer. "Compatibilism." Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p. 60.
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Frankfurt attacks the first hom of the dilemma in the following way: if Jones does
have flickers of freedom such that they can result in alternate actions, Fischer argues that they
are likely insufficient for moral grounding. He attacks the second hom by arguing that if
Jones does not have flickers of freedom which can result in alternate actions, this does not
mean that it is in principle impossible to produce a case in which Jones does not have
alternate possibilities and Jones' actions are not causally necessitated. Fischer, then, is putting
the onus his critic to prove 1) that the flickers of freedom which may exist in current
Frankfurtian examples are such that they are sufficiently robust enough to ground moral
responsibility and 2) that it is not possible to generate a Frankfurtian-style counter-example in
which there are no legitimate alternative possibilities.
Michael Della Rocca responds to Fischer's claim that flickers of freedom are
insufficient for the grounding of moral responsibility in his paper "Frankfurt, Fischer and
Flickers." Not only does Della Rocca respond that according to Fischer'S, flickers of freedom
are sufficient for the grounding of moral responsibility, but also he points out that in Fischer's
own words, it is extremely difficult to provide Frankfurt-style examples in which the world
described allows for no alternative possibilities. He quotes Fischer:
[1]t is hard to see how a Frankfurt-type example could be constructed which would
have absolutely no such flicker. For a Frankfurt-type case must have an alternative
sequence in which intervention is triggered in some fashion or other, and it is hard to
see how to avoid the idea that the triggering event can serve as the flicker of
freedom. 27
Of course, for Fischer, this need not be a significant problem because he essentially wants to
ignore the alternative scenarios and focus on the actual sequence of events. Della Rocca
argues, though, that ifthere is a possible flicker which an agent could have, but did not result

27Michael Della Rocca. "Frankfurt, Fischer, and Flickers." Nous 32, no. 1, 1998. p. 100.
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in an alternate sequence, the absence of that feature is necessary for the actual sequence
"Jones votes for candidate A to obtain." (What Della Rocca is doing is distinguishing between
flickers which actually could result in an alternative sequence and ones which could notsuch as the "raise eyebrow" example.) If the fact that Jones does not exist in the state F is not
causally determined, the fact that he could be in state "F" or not be in state "F" results in the
fact that Jones' action is not determined by external factors. As a result, Della Rocca points
out that
[A]n incompatibilist would hold that Jones' responsibility for his action stems, at least
in part, from the fact (if indeed it is a fact) that his actions about Jones himself are
such that he was not F. Since the flicker of freedom guarantees that there is this lack of
external determination the flicker can itself be seen as helping to ground ascriptions of
responsibility i.e. the flicker can (together, perhaps, with certain other features) suffice
for moral responsibility. ,,28
Most importantly, this reply does not rely on the alternate sequence. Jones' being "not
F" is a component of the actual sequence of events. If the flicker is such that by Fischer's own
lights that there is a possible world in which this flicker could have obtained and Jones would
have responded to it (and can do so with regularity) then the flicker seems to be sufficient for
what Fischer terms "moderate reasons-responsiveness" (which I will discuss in detail later).
This moderate reasons-responsiveness and the fact that the flicker is Jones' own should be
sufficient for Fischer to acknowledge it as robust enough to ground moral responsibility by
his own account.
Having said all of this, it is not the first hom of the dilemma upon which I will focus
most of my attention; it is Fischer's reply to the second hom of the dilemma with which I will
concern myself. He argues that Frankfurt need not be begging the question. Instead, according
to Fischer, the set-up which removes the possibility of alternatives paths for Mr. Jones also
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plays no relevant role in the choices or actions ofMr. Jones. It is also, then, irrelevant to his
moral responsibility. According to Fischer the agent need not be able to both prevent and
bring about the event. This ability is what Fischer tenns "regulative control." Fischer reasons
as follows, "So the distinctive element added by the Frankfurt-type examples under the
assumption of casual detenninism, is this: if the relevant agent is not morally responsible, it is
not because of his lack of regulative control.,,29 What Frankfurt's counter-examples do then,
according to Fischer, is demonstrate to us that regulative control is not necessary for moral
responsibility.
What Fischer must prove is that regulative control is not necessary for moral
responsibility, as regulative control is what the Consequence Argument denies us. First, I
should clarify the distinction that Fischer makes between regulative control and guidance
control. Regulative control is essentially total control of an event. One who has regulative
control can prevent the event from occurring, as well as bring the event about. To have
regulative control of an action is to have the ability to do otherwise. Guidance control is the
control one has if one's action results from one's own reasons-responsive mechanism. The
agent may not be able to prevent the event, but it is the result the agent's own mechanism
which can respond to reasons. Because this kind of control does not require alternate
possibilities, Fischer argues, "Both mechanism-ownership and reasons-responsiveness are
entirely compatible with causal detenninism; thus, I contend that even if causal detennination
threatens regulative control, it is perfectly compatible with moral responsibility.,,3o As causal
detenninism does not prevent agents from having reasons responsive mechanisms, guidance

29 John Martin Fischer. "Compatibilism. " Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p. 60.
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control is not threatened by causal detenninism. So the question becomes, "Is all that is
necessary for moral responsibility guidance control?"
Fischer argues that this separation of responsibility from regulative control is in
essence what is demonstrated by the Frankfurtian examples and in examples like John
Locke's locked room argument. Locke describes a situation in which an agent freely chooses
to stay inside a room which he does not know is locked; he cannot leave the room, but he does
not know this, so when he chooses to stay in it, it is a kind of free action. In both Locke's
example and Frankfurt's example the agents take actions which arise from their own will
without interference (so the actions are their own) and those actions are ones which are the
result of practical deliberation-and so it is reasons-responsive. What agent Jones is
demonstrating in the Frankfurt's example is that one can have guidance control without
having regulative control. This guidance control, says Fischer, is what is necessary for moral
responsibility. This is what Frankfurt's examples tease apart for us; we can lack regulative
control and yet still have guidance control, and, if Fischer is right, we then can be held
morally culpable for our actions.

Ch. 8 Fischer and Two Initial Concerns
It seems that Fischer may be using a bit of philosophical sleight of hand. There are two

ways in which what we are buying from Fischer and what we are being sold are not
necessarily the same things. The first is that his argument, at least via his examples, seems to
be one which actually addresses fatalism and not detenninism. The second is that this
argument may, in reality, be the old compatibilist standard that freedom to commit an action,
as long as it does not involve coercion, only requires that one be free of restraint and that one
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has the power to commit the act if one wants to commit the act. The first problem is not fatal
to his argument, but I do believe that it misdirects the reader into having intuitions regarding
responsibility and fatalism which he or she would not necessarily have in regards to causal
determinism. The second problem'may be more serious; Fischer may only be providing us
with the same compatibilist argument in shiny new packaging-one which suffers from the
same problems that Fischer claims to avoid.
Examples like Frankfurt's and Locke's, are not just cases in which agents cannot do
otherwise, they are cases in which a particular event will occur-regardless of what the agent
does. This is a kind of fatalism, which should not be confused with causal determinism. In
determinism, an agent's actions bring about events, and they are therefore subject to
counterfactual possibilities-if the agent did not act as he did, a different event would have
taken place. The future may not be a garden of forking paths for the determinist, but it also
has not been laid out in advance either. In Frankfurt's example, though, Jones will vote for A
no matter what he does. The event will occur; it is, in essence, fated. What he is pointing out
is that it is the causal role of Jones' reasons that matters in delegating moral responsibility.
This is not necessarily true for Fischer.
As I stated previously, this need not be a problem for Fischer, but it does deceive the
reader in the following way: cases of fatalism are cases in which an agent mayor may not
want a particular event to come about, and, yet the event comes to pass regardless. In these
cases, the fact that the event comes about regardless of the agents' intentions seems to imply
that the agent is free to intend to do otherwise. Those intentions need not also be fated-in
some conceptions of fatalism the agent is still condemned to commit the act, but he or she can
rail against fate. We, then, as observers, can blame the agent for his intentions or absolve him
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for the action ifhe perfonned the act solely because he could not do otherwise. But, this is
distinct and different from a case in which the agent cannot will, intend, or desire to do
otherwise than he or she does and, yet, the future is not pre-written; whether or not a
particular event comes to pass can be dependent on whether or not the agent acts in a
particular way. Some of what moves us intuitively about Jones is the fatalistic nature of his
predicament. Fischer paints a picture where we still feel that if Jones wanted to, he could rail
against fate, due to Fischer's admission of flickers of freedom, despite the fact that it would
change nothing.
Fischer's appeal to reasons-responsiveness acts as evidence to my claim. He describes
Frankfurt's example as a case in which not only is the agent the initiator of the act, but he or
she does so for reasons. In causal detenninism it is not as if we have an agent who is trapped
in a room, capable of willing otherwise and, yet, unable to leave. In this case, it seems that we
can point the finger at him and say, "Ah well, despite the fact the he is fated to stay in the
room, he both initiates the act of staying in the room and wants to stay in the room." It may be
that Frankfurt and Fischer present us with fatalistic examples which bring about powerful
intuitions in part because the agents willingly choose to do as they do. However, if they did
not, they would be forced to commit the act but could, perhaps, rail against it-in essence it
would be against their wills and they could display flickers which indicate that the act is
against their wills. One can imagine raging against fate in ways that causal detenninism does
not usually bring to mind. In the case of causal detenninism, that raging is the necessary
consequent of the summation of previous factors, but that same raging, like every other event,
impacts future events. In fatalism, rage all you want, you cannot change what will happen.
Having said all of this, Frankfurt and Fischer are still presenting us with examples in which an
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agent cannot act other than he does and many of us are still intuitively compelled to hold him
responsible for his act because there is no intervention by any other factor forcing him to do
as he does.
My second concern focuses on the possibility that Fischer may not really be presenting
us with an argument that is sufficiently different from the older version of compatibilism.
Consider the older version of compatibilism: the compatibilist asserts that deeper-robust
appeals to freedom and responsibility are essentially nonsensical. The compatibilist tells us
that if an agent commits an act, and does so willingly and willfully, there is nothing more
necessary for responsibility. It does not matter whether or not the act and these willings are all
things about which we cannot do otherwise. Moreover, to appeal to a deeper sense of
freedom, one in which our willings are "our own," makes no logical sense. We obviously are
not prime movers, and to seek a kind of total control and freedom from causal chains for our
wills is nonsense, says the compatibilist.
The compatibilist, of course, makes sure to make room for coercion as something for
which we are not responsible because, say some compatibilists, we intuitively rebel against
the idea of another agent forcing us to commit an act. ill the case of determinism, there is no
agent to rebel against, there is no other will than our own bringing about our actions. There
are just causal chains which result in our wills and our actions, which, in every meaningful
way, are our own. This account is rather similar to Fischer's in the following way: there is an
assertion that in order to be morally responsible, the act must be "our own," and although the
act must be our own, the reasons and intentions which result in the act only need be "our
own" in a weak sense. We then, according to the older account, have enough meaningful
freedom of will to be held morally responsible. All that is necessary for responsibility is that
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we are the cause of the event and that our action is one which is the result of our reasons (it is
one which results from our will), which may be the result of things outside of our control.
Fischer also recognizes that our intentions arise from causes outside of our control and does
not think that for them to be "our own" needs to mean anything more than that they are in us
and are not the result of coercion of another agent. The older version asserts that we have
"enough" freedom to be held accountable and he is arguing that we have "enough" control to
be held accountable. These may be synonymous, ifby "free," Fischer means that our actions
are our own and result from our will. The reason this criticism may be a significant one is
simply because the older compatibilist account faces many challenges (largely presented by
the Consequence Argument), and, therefore, so may Fischer's.

Ch. 9 The Problem of Mr. Black
Nevertheless, Fischer's arguments continue to demonstrate to us that an agent can
have enough control over an event for us to blame him for the event, even in the face of the
Consequence Argument. What Fischer may be doing, then, is not providing an argument
substantially different from the older compatibilist argument, but, instead, presenting an
argument which presents the older arguments for compatibilism from a new perspective
which demonstrates to us that the consequence argument can be side-stepped. Assuming that
this is all true, a concern comes to my mind that bothers me far more than the ones above. It is
simply this: "What about Mr. Black?"
I will begin with a brief aside: it has been pointed out to me that Black may not have
regulative control. It may be that he also only has guidance control. In other words, he may
only be able to force Jones to vote for A but be unable to prevent Jones from not voting for A,
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in this case, his control is severely limited. First, I see little reason to believe that this is the
intention in the case as Frankfurt and Fischer paint it. If Black has mind control, or is a
nefarious neurosurgeon who has the ability to force Jones to vote or the ability to implant a
chip in his brain without Jones' knowledge, it seems unlikely that he can only trigger Jones in
one way. Having said this, it is not an impossibility that he lacks the ability to prevent Jones
from voting for B, but even if Black cannot prevent Jones from voting for A, he still has
substantial control over Jones. For this reason, it is interesting that Jones may be more
blameworthy when there is an agent who can and will force him to commit the act.
Nevertheless, let us say that Black does have regulative control for the sake of my argument
and can both force Jones to vote for A and force Jones to not vote for A.
Consider the following scenario: Jones votes for candidate A, and candidate A wins.
Due to this fact, things go horribly wrong. Moreover, Jones' vote is a critical one. Jones'
friends, upon finding out that he voted for A, are livid. Moreover, his crime is made far worse
by the fact that had he not voted for A, their lives would be far better. So, they decide to string
Mr. Jones up. They drag him outside, throw a noose over a tree limb, and place Jones on a
horse and a noose around his neck. Now, to further complicate matters, imagine that Black,
being an active observer of Jones' actions feels that it is his moral obligation to step in to
defend Jones and try to save his life. He tells Jones' friends that he in fact had regulative
control over Jones' action. He could have prevented the act from coming into being, and he

would have made sure that the event would take place regardless of Jones will. What does
J

our mob do? Well, they may inquire whether Black interfered at all. Upon his reply that he
did nothing, they decide to hang Jones anyway (after all, he did have guidance control). Now,
what do we do with Mr. Black, do we hang him as well? Remember, Black did nothing. So,
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for what can we blame him? It seems that Mr. Black may walk away from our mob not only
unharmed, but truly innocent.
It seems reasonable to assert that choosing to continue to follow a particular course (in

this case of not preventing an event) is still an action, if one has regulative control. Mr. Black,
in essence, brought the event about. His action to bring that event about is an omission.
Moreover, he intended that the event take place, it does take place, and it would not have
taken place had he willed otherwise because he would have forced Jones to vote for
whichever candidate Black supports. Now, this is significantly different from the man who
believes he can make it rain and it just so happens that it does rain that day. In Black's case,
he has so much control over the event that its occurrence really does depend on his letting it
happen. Consider the following example. Mr. Black's child finds a fork and walks past Black
towards an electrical wall outlet. He tells Black that he is about to place the fork into the
outlet. Now it happens that the child is small and slow, so it is well within Black's power to
stop the child without endangering either Black or the child, but Black does not because Black
is sadistic and wishes the child to suffer. As a matter of fact Black has already decided to
force the child to electrocute himself even if the child changes his mind last second. If Black
does nothing to prevent the child's act, what excuse will he use to deny his responsibility?
Is it sufficient to say that the event was not the result of Black's action, and so Black is
not responsible, despite both the fact that he really wants the event to come about and the fact
that he will ensure that it will come about? I would hold Black completely responsible for the
child's death, despite his lack of action, and it seems that so would Fischer. His choice not to
act to prevent the event is the event for which I would hold him responsible, and that event is
one which directly resulted in the child's death. In his discussion of omissions, Fischer argues
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that the case of moral responsibility with regards to actions is symmetrical in regard to
omissions. An agent is responsible for his omission if the omission is such that he has
guidance control of that omission. As he both acted in a way which killed the child and
intended that it take place, and, according to Fischer, he has guidance control of the omission,
he is responsible. But this is also problematic; consider, again, the scenario of Black and
Jones.
Keep in mind that for Fischer's argument to work, Frankfurt's case must be one in
which there are no robust alternative possibilities for Jones. The problem deepens because
Jones' intentions must also be determined, or at least relegated to being only "flickers of
freedom." Otherwise, a critic could argue that Frankfurt and Fischer are not providing us with
true counter-examples. Imagine Jones' reaction to the news that, not only was his action one
over which Black had regulative control, but so were his (Jones') robust intentions. Now of
course, our angry mob will quickly reply, "But Black never actually had to alter Jones'
intentions!" Jones could respond that this does not necessarily negate Black's responsibility
for them. Black could have made Jones' intentions otherwise, but he chose not to, and in
doing so took on a level of responsibility for those intentions. It may well be that Fischer is
relegating us to conclude that when one does not have guidance control, one is not
responsible. Similarly, because the event is his own, it seems that Jones could make a
powerful point in arguing for his lack of culpability by noting that his own intentions are not
things for which he is the uncaused cause, which is a significant problem for Jones being
responsible for the event "Jones is responsible for the event 'Jones intends to vote for A. ,,,
These willings are the result of luck, his upbringing, genetics, natural laws, and so forth. Now,
normally, he might argue, he would agree that he is responsible for them because, after all, he
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can change those intentions, or at least try to change them, but in this case he can do neither.
We are therefore blaming him for his intentions which are not initially caused by him, and are
things he cannot change.
I am not arguing that in order to be held responsible, Jones must be the uncaused cause
of his own intentions. Instead, I am arguing that as he is not the uncaused cause of his
intentions. His intentions are such that he cannot make them other than they are, thus he
would have good reason to argue that he is not responsible-or at least not as responsible as
Mr. Black. Mr. Black has ability to make Jones intend otherwise, but Jones does not. If! am
right, Black, then, is also responsible for the event Jones voted for A. We have an agent,
Black, who intended and actually acted to bring about an event and we have another agent,
Jones, who only had guidance control over the event; are they both responsible? If they are
not, how do we mediate who is more responsible, as it does seem that the one with more
control should be more responsible? But, this does not seem to be a quantifiable matter. One
answer does come to mind, which is the following: Black and Jones are actually responsible
for different events, and, therefore, should be held morally responsible for different events.
Specifically, Black is responsible for the event "Jones votes for A" and Jones is responsible
for the event "Jones intends to vote for A". It seems that Fischer might seem sympathetic to
this argument, as he states,
On this account, there may be two steps: a certain kind of mechanism issues in the
bodily movement and then a process take place that connects the bodily movement to
some event in the external world. In order for the sequence (involving both steps) to
be appropriately responsive to reason, the mechanism leading to the bodily movement
must be moderately reasons-responsive, and the process leading to the event in the
external world must be sensitive to the bodily movement. 31
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So there are cases in which an agent, according to Fischer, is responsible for the omission, but
not responsible for the event which seems to result from the omission. For example, an agent
may believe that she can make it rain (and be mistaken in that belief) but choose not to try to
make it rain. She would be responsible for the omission on Fischer's account-the choice to
not try to make it rain-but not for the fact that it does not rain, because that event is not
actually sensitive to her omission, despite her belief to the contrary.
The case of Jones and Black, though, does not meet this criterion. According to
Fischer, Jones' action is something over which he has guidance control, and so he is
responsible, but it also seems that Black's omission-his choice not to interfere and to allow
Jones to vote as he does-is also something over which Black has guidance control.
Moreover, Black has control over both Jones' intentional states and his action, thus Black is
also responsible for Jones' action. When considering the case of Black and Jones, one may be
inclined to dismiss the fact that they are both responsible, as it simply seems to be a case of
two agents both being responsible for the same event-in the same way that two burglars may
work together and so be responsible for the same burglary.
What is interesting about the case of Jones and Black, though, is not that they are both
responsible for the voting of candidate A but that they are both responsible for the event
"Jones votes for candidate A." Specifically, both Jones and Black are responsible for Jones'
own action and for his intention. This does seem odd, but that need not be a problem. Fischer
may simply be pointing us to something that we were unaware of before: that two agents can
both be responsible for one agents' action. Keep in mind that they are not just both
responsible for the actual event as it comes about, but in this particular case, they are both
responsible for the actual intentional states and action of the agent. Nevertheless, as Black can
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actually change Jones' intentions and Jones cannot, it at least seems that there should be a
difference between the two. The case seems incredibly close to one of coercion. Granted,
Jones commits the act unimpeded, and so this is not just a simple case of Black taking control
of Jones and Jones enjoying the ride.
Nevertheless, Black, by Fischer's own account, does have guidance control as well as
regulative control of Jones. My intuitions though are such that Jones should not be responsible
if another agent has control of his actions and intentions. These intentions are meaningless,
though, unless I can give a reason. The reason which I will provide for the difference between
Black and Jones, which will dictate that Black is responsible and absolves Jones, is that Jones'
actions and intentions are not reasons-responsive, as Fischer contends. Simply, in regards to
them, Jones does not have a reasons-responsive mechanism. In order to defend this position, I
must first explain Fischer's account of reasons-responsiveness.

Ch. 10 Fischer's and Ravizza's Account of Reasons-Responsiveness
In their book, Responsibility and Control, Fischer and Mark Ravizza present a highly

detailed account of moral-responsibility. They argue that Frankfurt's counter-examples point
us towards what actually matters in moral responsibility-the actual sequence of events.
Events which could have, but did not, playa role in the agents' deliberation regarding the act
are intuitively such that they should not playa role in our judgment about the moral
responsibility of the agent. What actually matters is if the agents' action is "his own," and if
that action is appropriately reasons-responsive. To be his own, largely, only requires that it
results from the agent's personal non-coerced reasons-responsive mechanism-and so it is on
this reasons-responsiveness that much focus is directed.
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To be reasons-responsive in a strong sense, says Fischer, requires that the agent would
1) recognize the sufficient reason to do otherwise, 2) intend to do otherwise in response to that
reason, and 3) be able to actuate that intention. In this way, agents cannot be said to be
strongly reasons-responsive if they do not know about them, if they are epistemologically
unapproachable, or if their intention to act on the reason is blocked by some intervention, or if
their attempt to actuate that intention is blocked by some intervention. But what Frankfurt
shows us, says Fischer, is that this strong reasons-responsiveness is too strong and so it is
more than is needed for an agent to be held responsible. What is actually important is not all
of those factors, but instead that there is a possible world such that the agent could and would
do otherwise provided with sufficient reason.
He terms this criterion of there being at least one possible world in which an agent can
respond to reasons "weak reasons-responsiveness." Fischer argues that this is too weak
because it allows for agents to respond to a reason which may be completely illogical and
such that we cannot understand why the agent would respond to that reason, but not to another
almost exact reason-which may mean that the agent himself is irrational. Fischer argues that
what is necessary for moral responsibility is "moderate reasons-responsiveness," which
requires weak reasons-responsiveness plus that the agent shows regularity in recognizing
reasons and that the agent, when he does otherwise, does so because of the reason. Adding
these two new components enables Fischer to hold an agent accountable who has the mental
capacity to recognize good reasons regularly and is only accountable if there is an appropriate
connection between his reasons and actions (he acts because of his reasons).
This rejection of strong reasons-responsiveness as necessary for moral responsibility is
motivated by Frankfurt's counter-examples. Due to the fact that our intuitions tell us that
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Jones is still responsible for his action, strong reasons-responsiveness cannot be necessary for
moral responsibility (if our intuitions are correct) because Jones does not have the ability to
have alternate intentions or act on those alternate intentions even given a good reason to do
so. It does seem, though, that Jones would show regularity in ability to recognize reasons and
the ability to connect his reasons to his actions in the actual sequence of events; there are also
possible worlds in which Jones responds to reasons to vote for other than candidate A and, so,
he meets the criterion of "moderate reasons-responsiveness." It is important to realize that
Fischer argues that there is a possible world in which Jones responds to reasons to do
otherwise from the standpoint of the actual-sequence of events. It seems, that, at least prima
facie, Fischer can argue that because Jones' action results from his own reasons, that if there
were sufficient other reasons, then he would not be motivated to act as he does due to his own
reasons, and due to Black's control he would be motivated to act due to Black's' reasons. In
this way, there is a possible world in which Jones responds to reasons to do otherwise.
This seems to leave Fischer as having to deal with the horns of a dilemma, though. If
we are able to blame Jones because of the kinds reasons-responsiveness demonstrated by
Jones in the Frankfurtian counter-examples, it seems that we can ground moral responsibility
in a flicker of freedom. Fischer might be committed to this because by his account it is Jones'
ability to respond differently to sufficient reason which seems to identify him as a moral
agent. Although Jones cannot actually act otherwise, Fischer argues that he has weak reasonsresponsiveness because there is a possible world in which Jones responds to reasons to do
otherwise. He states,
(WRR): As with strong reasons-responsiveness, we hold fixed the operation of the
actual kind of mechanism, and we then simply require that there exist some possible
scenario (or possible world) - with the same laws as the actual world - in which there
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is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent recognizes this reason, and the agent
.
32
does otherwise.
It does not seem that the Jones case is clearly one in which the agent is responsible only due

to the fact that he acts as he does so unimpeded; he is responsible also because he has a kind
of power-he has the ability to respond to a reason and not act differently than he does but,
indulge a flicker of freedom which for one instant indicated that he wills to do otherwise,
forcing Black to act. It seems then that the incompatibilist can argue that it is this flicker of
freedom-as in Della Roca's account-enables Jones to be treated as an object of praise and
blame, without it he could not be rationally treated as such. This of course begs the question
(as Della Roca points out). What Fischer is failing to do, though, is provide us with an
account which definitively proves that these flickers of freedom-and hence the ability to do
otherwise, even in the smallest of ways--do not exist in the Frankfurtian counter-examples,
and so they may be sufficient for grounding moral responsibility.
Nevertheless, recall that Fischer does state that we do not have definitive proof that it
is, in principle, impossible to construct a count example which removes all flickers of
freedom and the agent is still held morally responsible. For the sake of argument, let us
consider the Jones case one in which all flickers of freedom have been made impossible and,
moreover, due to the nature of the actual-sequence of events, we are inclined to hold Jones
responsible. Despite the fact that this world is a world which seems to assume a kind of causal
determinism for Jones, we still must address our intuition that he is responsible. This world,
though, leaves Fischer on the second hom of the dilemma which is that Jones cannot even
meet the criterion for weak-reasons responsiveness in this case; his reasons are such that they
result from other reasons in the actual sequence, but they do not seem to be reasons
32
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responsive. So, then, the dilemma is this: either Fischer allows for flickers of freedom in
regard to Jones' ability to respond to reasons, in which case the incompatibilist may argue that
these flickers act as a kind of alternative possibility and so we have not definitively proven
that 1) alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility and 2) that flickers of
freedom are not robust enough to ground moral responsibility. Quite the contrary, it seems
that Fischer's example demonstrates the exact opposite: the flicker in the Jones case seems to
be what ground his reasons-responsiveness and hence his moral responsibility, or Fischer
argues that the Jones case removes all possible flickers of freedom, in which case it seems that
Jones' actions do result from reasons but are not responsive to them.
Fischer's response to this, though, is simple. By his account, Jones need not be able to
respond to reasons in the actual world. There only need be some possible world in which
Jones can respond to a reason to do otherwise, and, so, Fischer would respond to the above
criticism by arguing that even if Jones has no flickers of freedom in the actual world, as long
as there is a possible world in which his mechanism can respond to reasons, then he can be
held morally responsible. The question then becomes, "Is this kind of reasons-responsiveness
sufficient for the grounding of moral responsibility?" Note that for Fischer, flickers of
freedom are not robust enough to ground moral responsibility, but, interestingly, the
potentiality of an agent to respond to a reason in even a distant possible world is sufficient to
ground ascriptions of moral responsibility. In the following chapter I will argue that this
particular notion of reasons-responsiveness leaves open for moral consideration possible
worlds which are not sufficiently morally relevant to Jones' action, and, yet, by Fischer's
account, supposedly make Jones a proper obj ect of praise and blame.
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Ch. 11 Reasons-Responsiveness and Reasons-Resultance
Fischer tells us that in order for an agent to have guidance-control "he must act from
his own reasons-responsive mechanism.,,33 This means, in essence, that the action is one
which is the result of reasons and practical deliberation by the agent. On Fischer's and
Ravizza's account, agents are not just responsible when they are reasons-responsive; an agent
can only be responsible for a particular act ifhe or she is acting from his or her own reasonsresponsive mechanism. Making this distinction eliminates the possibility of blaming the agent
for actions which belong to the agent, but which are not the result of his own reasons (such as
epileptic fits or mind-control). The agents in Frankfurtian counter-examples have guidance
control because, as long as Mr. Black does not intervene-in part because the actual sequence
of events follows Jones' reasons, and because it is such that there is a possible world in which
Jones does respond to a sufficient reason to do otherwise-his act is reasons-responsive. I will
provide an argument that Jones is not responsible for his action because Jones' action does not
result from a reasons-responsive mechanism in the actual world.
I state this because it seems rather clear that, despite Fischer's argument to the
contrary, Jones does not meet the criterion for weak reasons-responsiveness if what we are
talking about is the actual world as described in the FrankfurtlFischer case. In the actual
world, if the case is such that there is no reason with which Jones could be presented which
results in his not voting for A due to the fact that Black will force him to do so. Granted, there
are possible worlds in which Black keels over from a heart attack and, therefore, cannot force
Jones to vote for candidate A, but I take Fischer's point to be most relevant when the question
of possible worlds is directly connected to reasons and to the actual world. Moreover, this is
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not unfair to Fischer, as he repeatedly asserts that it is the actual sequence of events with
which we should be concerned when dealing with moral responsibility.
My concern regarding Fischer's possible worlds account is that, although he does
require that the natural laws be the same, he says little about Jones' counter-part in the
possible world in which Jones can respond to reasons. For example, it seems that agents who
are brainwashed must be held morally accountable on Fischer's account. Although they may
be brainwashed in the actual world, and thereby lack the ability to consider reasons, they are
acting from a reasons-responsive mechanism because there is a possible world in which they
were not brainwashed and so can respond to reason. My intuition may simply differ from
Fischer's account, but given the additional problem of Mr. Black-the fact that both Black
and Jones are responsible for Jones' actions and intentions-it seems that the possible world
scenario may simply allow agents to be held responsible too easily. Even given Fischer's
moderate reasons-responsiveness approach in which an agent must be able to recognize
reasons with regularity, the problem of brainwashing and Mr. Black remain due to the fact
that there need be no highly illogical nature to the way in which the coerced agents' actions
result from their reasons.
Fischer may argue that problems of brainwashing need not be problems for him; in
this case the action does not stem from a mechanism which is the agent's own. Given his
criterion, I see little reason to concede this point. If an agent has been effectively brainwashed
over a long period oftime, and truly believes that his intentional states are his own, I do not
think that Fischer can provide an account of ownership that would not necessarily require that
an agent be an uncaused cause of his own intentional states. We are all regularly convinced by
other agents to change what we want, desire, and think. There must be some reason why
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brainwashing is a case in which an agent is morally absolved other than just ownership.
Moreover, if, in the case of brainwashing, an agent actually has the ability to deliberate
practically and can respond to good reasons to do otherwise, I see no reason why a
brainwashed agent should not be held accountable for what he does. Instead, it is my
argument that it is only in the cases in which the brainwashing results in the agent's being
unable to consider other reasons and effectively indulge in practical deliberation that he or she
should be absolved. In contrast, by Fischer's account, that same agent must be held
responsible because he or she acts from a mechanism which is moderately reasonsresponsive; granted, it has been deeply influenced by other agents, but not to the extent that it
no longer belongs to the brainwashed agent.
It seems, then, that the question, "Is there a possible world in which the agent responds
to a relevant reason?" may allow too many cases which are intuitively problematic. In order to
narrow the scope of the question and to locate the qualities of the agent which are both actual
and relevant to his responsibility, we should consider whether or not the agent's mechanism
was actually able to respond to reasons. The question regarding possible reasonsresponsiveness is most relevant when it is stated as "Is there a possible reason that if
presented to Jones, he would do otherwise than he does in the actual world?" Or even, "Is
there a possible reason such that if presented to Jones he would have wanted to do other than
he does in the actual world?" What we realize is that given Black's control over whether or
not Jones can want and do otherwise makes the answer to both of the questions "no."
Although there may be a possible world in which Black keels over, or something akin
to this, what actually should matter in regards to the actual sequence of events is Jones' ability
to respond to reasons, not his potential ability. Given a world in which Black can control
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Jones' intentions, wants, desires, etc., there is no reason which could actually dissuade Jones
from doing as he does. So I contend that his mechanism is not reasons-responsive in a world
in which Mr. Black can and will ensure that Jones will act in a particular way. In order for an
agent's action to be at least weakly reasons-responsive, it should result from a mechanism for
which there is a possible reason to which he could respond in the actual world.
Given the description of Jones' case, his actions are only reasons-resultant. By
"reasons-resultant," I mean that the event is the direct result of reasons on the part of the
agent, which, similar to reasons-responsiveness, eliminates epileptic fits and mind control as
cases of control on the part of the agent. The phrase reasons-responsiveness should, instead,
be used to describe only those mechanisms which actually can respond to reasons. In the
actual world, his actions result from reasons, but this does not necessitate that the world is
such that his mechanism can respond to reasons. An agent's mechanism is reasons-resultant if
the mechanism is such that the agents' actions result from reasons which are the
psychological cause of the action, but that does not mean that the same mechanism is also
reasons-responsive. It may produce actions which are the result of reasons, but that same
mechanism may not be able to respond to different reasons, it is not responsive to practical
deliberation.
Fischer may likely to object that what actually matters is the actual-sequence and that
the actual mechanism is reasons-responsive. My reply is that Jones' mechanism does indeed
result from particular reasons, but it does not meat the criterion, "There is a possible reason to
which Jones can respond in a world in which Black can control Jones and wants him to vote
for A. The actual sequence results from reasons, but it is not even weakly responsive to
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reasons, as it is so deeply restricted. In this way, I argue that Jones' mechanism is only
"reasons-resultant. "
This distinction is important because concepts like fatalism remove reasonsresponsiveness as possible for agents in regards to the fated events. Reasons-responsiveness is
irrelevant to the outcome. As I have pointed out, it seems that the Frankfurtian cases are ones
which are fatalistic. Jones' actions may be reasons-resultant, but not reasons-responsive.
Moreover, it may well be that while reasons-responsiveness and ownership is sufficient for
moral responsibility, reasons-resultance and ownership may not be. Consider the following
scenario: an agent-let's call him George-has reasons for an action he is about to commit. In
this scenario, though, let us also imagine that once he has made the decision to commit the
act, he is no longer able to change his mind, despite any reasons which may come his way.
So, his decision to act is reasons-responsive but his execution of that action is not. Reasons
from other agents cannot have an impact on his decision, nor can reasons of his own. The
reasons-resultant nature of his act is insufficient for moral responsibility in George's case
according to Fischer. George, in this case, is essentially a prisoner in his own mind-he is in
effect a moral zombie. Despite the fact that there may be a possible world in which George is
not restricted in this way, that particular possible world does not seem relevant to George's
moral responsibility. We would likely argue that although his action is the result of reasons of
his own, his inability to respond to even the most extreme reasons (say the act is one which
result in his own harm, death, or in the harm or death of a loved one) makes him an
inappropriate object of moral blame. This is not to say that possible worlds or counter factuals
are innately irrelevant to problems of moral responsibility, only that in the case of determining
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if an agent has a reasons-responsive mechanism, what actually matters in regards to moral
responsibility is if the agent has the ability to even consider reasons.
Certainly, George would meet the exemption requirements described by Strawson.
This example becomes extremely forceful when one considers the possibility that these new
reasons, to which he cannot respond, face him with consequences which he does not want.
George, in essence, is an extreme compulsive, and it seems that despite the reasons-resultant
nature of his action, his lack of reasons-responsiveness makes him in inappropriate object of
moral responsibility. fu other words, if an agent's practical deliberation cannot effect whether
or not the event will take place, we are disinclined to view the agent as having sufficient
control for moral responsibility. Note, that in this case I am not describing an agent who is
just stubborn an unwilling to change his decision. fustead, I am describing an agent who, for
whatever reason, cannot change his decision. fu Frankfurt's examples, the agent's action,
intentions, and reasons are not reasons-responsive. They are only reasons-resultant. The fact
that an agent's actions are ones which result from his or her reasons may not necessitate that
the agent is morally responsible for them, as in the case of George the compulsive.
It may be that some may completely disagree with my intuition. One may see George
as completely blameworthy and may be rather confused by my assertion that George may not
be responsible. To this my reply is in the form of a question: "What then is the difference
between an agent whose actions are only reasons-resultant and an agent whose actions are
also reasons-responsive?" This question is an important one for the delegation of moral
responsibility. Consider that the difference between the two, if there is any, is described as the
difference between an agent who is about to commit an act and one who has already
committed the act.
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This presents a potential problem for my account, though. A past action may be
reasons-resultant but it is no longer reasons-responsive; the action is the result of reasons, but,
as it is in the past, cannot be responsive to reasons. For example, my action of typing right
now is one which is not only reasons-resultant, but also reasons-responsive. My continuing to
type not only results from my reasons but also is responsive to my reasons: the event is one
which would respond to reasons like "I should stop typing because I need a break."
Looking at it from this perspective, though, provides the exact opposite intuition than
I fmd in the case of "George the Moral Zombie." It seems that an agent who is about to
commit an act and who can consider reasons for and against the action is considered by us to
be less responsible than an agent who has already committed the act. This is largely because
blaming an agent for an action which has not come yet come into existence seems rather
unreasonable. The difference here cannot be just because of the reasons-responsiveness or
resultance. It makes no sense to think of reasons-responsiveness to be a feature which makes
an agent less responsible than those which are reasons-resultant. Then again, the only events
which are truly reasons-responsive are ones which have not yet occurred.
It seems that my mistake here is comparing events which may take place and events
which have already taken place, which presents problems particular to the past and future.
Instead, let's consider both as past. Events can be past and be considered reason-responsive
when considered from that moment in the actual timeline. The agent, at that past time, had the
ability to respond to other reasons. So my account does not make use of the same modal
semantics as Fischer's because I am not discussing the potential of the agent to respond to
reasons. Although I am dealing in counter-factuals, determining whether or not there is a
possible world such that he could have responded to sufficient reasons, but instead,
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detennining whether or not, at that time, he had the actual ability to respond to different
reasons. In Frankfurt's examples, Jones' action is still not even counter-factually reasonsresponsive. Moreover, it seems that he lacks a reasons-responsive mechanism in all relevantly
similar possible worlds. No matter what reasons with which he is presented, no matter his
deliberation, and no matter his own reasons, the event will take place. The event is only
reasons-resultant as it does result from his own reasons. On the other hand, the event of my
taking a break from typing (in the past) is both reasons-resultant and reasons-responsive when
considering counter-factuals. We can imagine that had different reasons come to mind I could
have chosen to not take the break. When considered this way, we can see a significant
difference in these two cases: one is a case of an agent who could not do otherwise regardless
of his reasons and yet his action does result from his reasons, and the other is a case of an
action that both results from my reasons and is responsive to my practical deliberation.
So what then of George's case? When we consider his action as one in the past, do we
hold him responsible? George acts because of particular reasons, but also, his action could not
be affected by other reasons, no matter how significant. Once again, it seems that George is a
compulsive, and depending on the degree of compulsion, he mayor may not be responsible.
At least, though, in George's case, the event was not necessitated. The fact the action was
only reasons-resultant is significant, because had George been able to consider other reasons,
it was possible that he would not have brought the event into existence. Jones, though, has
even less control: not only could other reasons not have dissuaded him from his act, but all
avenues which may have resulted in any flicker of freedom have been blocked off for him in
the actual world-including intentions, desires, motivations, willings etc. Moreover, the act
was one which would come to pass no matter what, unlike George's act which can or cannot
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come into being. When we blame Jones, we blame an agent who could not have prevented the
event, could not have been dissuaded even by the most significant of reasons, and could not
even intend otherwise.
Given the nature of this example, it seems that we would have to blame George and
Jones similarly. Consider that we would also be required to, for the sake of consistency,
continue to blame agents for their actions in a world in which there is a God who has decreed
that all events will take place as she wills, made it impossible for us to even consider doing
other than she wills, and decreed that we cannot intend otherwise than she wills. Obviously,
the God example will fail if God also places all events into motion because one could argue
that our intentions and actions are not our own-they are only an extension of God's will.
These events had been placed into motion with God's intention of bringing the event into
place, and not our own. Even Dennett and Fischer are unwilling to blame us in a situation if
our behaviors are the result of someone else's intentions. Consider, instead, that the
possibility that this god did not actually set the events into place. She walks into an already
unfolding universe and notes that she wants it to unfold in particular ways. She wants to
minimize her own impact, so when she doesn't have to act, she lets it unfold as she wills
without interference. All of a sudden, we are able to place blame, as long as God doesn't
interfere. But, what if God involves herself with all of the minutia? In that case, every thought
and intention is one which God's will can change in order bring about her will.
What, then, is the difference between an agent with whom God does interfere and the
agent with whom God does not have to interfere? It seems that Fischer's concept supports the
idea that one of them has guidance control and the other does not. I suggest that this is an
insufficient distinction: the situation is more clearly described as the first agent's actions are

67

Nicolas Michaud
reasons-resultant and the second agent's are not. The problem is that to assert that the agent
whose actions are reasons-resultant has any meaningful control in a world which is fatalistic
to this extreme degree is deeply counter-intuitive. Perhaps some of the agent's acts are such
that they are the result of unimpeded practical deliberation, but the agents in this world are
unable to actually change even the weakest intention. This agent would be, for all intent and
purposes be existing in individual non-reasons-responsive spheres-there is no possible world
in which an agent could even consider a different act, no matter how persuasive the reason.
This does not mean that he or she cannot be an object of praise or blame, but, instead, that
Fischer's argument that this kind ofreasons-resultance counts as a significant kind of control
is mistaken.
The wonderfully ironic result of my analysis is that although Frankfurt's examples
may be examples in which the agent only has a mechanism which can produce reasonsresultant actions and, therefore, may not be morally accountable, this does not necessitate the
same result for a causally deterministic world. Although there is good reason to believe that
Jones lacks so much control as to not be responsible in Frankfurt's and Fischer's worlds, the
world of causal-determinism lacks the fatalistic nature of the Frankfurtian scenario and the
one I generated concerning God. Simply, as I pointed out earlier, causal determinism is
distinct and different from fatalism. In a casually determined world our actions are reasonsresponsive. They are not just reasons-resultant because, in most circumstances, we can
practically deliberate on reasons and respond to them. So it may well be that we have more
control in a causally-determined world than Jones does in Frankfurt's counter-example.
From this distinction between reasons-resultance and reasons-responsiveness, it seems
that I can make another claim regarding responsibility: an agent should only be held morally
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responsible for those actions of his which result from his reasons-responsive mechanism and
that mechanism is responsive to reasons in the actual world. Actions which are only reasonsresultant are ones for which an agent lacks the sufficient control necessary to be an object of
praise or blame. In other words, he or she may still be subject to coercive forces such a mental
illness or a fatalistic scenario which is so deeply fatalistic that even his or her own basic
thoughts and feelings are fated. Even in a situation in which those thoughts and feelings are
his or her own, they lack the responsiveness to reasons which make an agent a proper object
of praise and blame.

Ch. 12 The Consequence Argument and Other Considerations
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument does present a significant problem for the
attribution of moral responsibility in a causally determined universe by my account in the
following way: events (and actions) which are past are, by definition, are no longer brought
about through a reasons-responsive mechanism. They were reasons-responsive at one time,
but this is no longer the case. And, so, I may be committed to accepting that agents can only
be held responsible for acts as they commit them-while they remain reasons-responsive. I do
not think this need be a fatal criticism for two reasons: 1) my account may act as evidence to
support the fairly common intuition that agents are not as much to blame for events that are
past-otherwise we would not make excuses like "what is past is past." Perhaps our desire for
punitive measures gets in the way of rational allocation of moral responsibility. Moreover,
punitive attribution of moral responsibility in a social sense seems to be directed towards
prevention, and, therefore, does not necessarily map cleanly onto the discussion of moral
responsibility in a strictly philosophical sense, and 2) the compatibilist retains the ability to
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allocate praise and blame in regards to events as we commit them, while they remain reasonsresponsive. The proponent of the Consequence Argument may reject this and argue that even
in the present our actions are not truly reasons-responsive because our actions are such that
they cannot be otherwise, and, therefore, any counter-factual imaginings are nonsense. In
response, I contend that he or she is not just committing himself to causal determinism, but
also to fatalism in regards to our actions because they are such that they will be as they will
be, regardless of reasons.
One may also attempt to defend my argument by pointing out that there is a deep
distinction between the metaphysical and epistemological in regards to moral responsibility.
We may, in actuality, be only concerned with what it is that agents believe is the case, rather
than what actually is the case, as we may never be able to obtain the point of view necessary
to determine if causal determinism is true and, moreover, whether that results in a kind of
fatalism in regards to our actions. As long as agents believe their actions are reasonsresponsive, they can be held responsible when we ignore the metaphysical perspective and
consider only what the agent can know. Interestingly, this results in Jones once again
becoming morally blameworthy, as he believes that his actions are reasons-responsive, despite
the fact that they are not. Intuitively, though, I dislike this picture and prefer one in which
moral responsibility is not so deeply subjective. Otherwise, some agents may be held
responsible while others are absolved in cases in which the only difference is whether or not
they believe in fatalism, for example.
Nevertheless, the Consequence Argument presents a legitimate problem for my
account and any account which holds agents responsible for the actual sequence of events
while acknowledging that the world is such that it was not possible, given the factors leading
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up to the actual sequence, that the sequence progress otherwise. Simply, it is nonsensical to
blame or praise an agent for not committing an event which he could not comniit. Even
Fischer would not blame the agent for an event which his bodily action or inaction could not
effect. This axiom seems to be imbedded in our idea that what is possible and impossible is
important in moral responsibility, and it is likely an important aspect the "ought implies can"
principle presented by Kant. So given this, and given the possibility that accounts like mine
allow moral responsibility to be assigned in a causally determined universe, we end up with a
somewhat asymmetric result if we agree that blaming agents for not doing things they could
not do is unreasonable because we can praise and blame agents only for their actual sequence
action in causal determinism and, therefore, we also cannot rationally state that they should
have done otherwise in anything more than a wishful-teleological sense. The state of our
moral ascriptions would be such that we could tell an agent that he is bad for doing a thing
due to his reason-responsiveness, but we also cannot rationally state that he should not have
done that thing. Given the nature of a causally determined universe, an agent's actions affect
the outcome of future events (unlike a fatalistic universe) but each action, nevertheless, is the
necessary consequence of the summation of the events preceding it. The agent who commits a
bad act, then, is one who can be blamed due to the reasons-responsive nature of his act, and,
yet, we cannot rationally tell him that he should not have done it in anything other than in a
wishful sense.
Fischer's program is, thus, one which leaves us with two problems: as agents are
responsible for omissions on his account, both Black and Jones are responsible for Jones'
actions and intentions. What we come to re<.tlize is that, especially in the case of Black and
Jones, an agent can have a kind of guidance control but lack a reasons-responsive mechanism;
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the agent's action may instead be only such that it is produced by a reasons-resultant
mechanism. Mr. Black, then, has far more control than does Jones due to the fact that his
reasons are responsive and he can both act to bring about the event and prevent its occurrence.
Jones should not be held morally responsible because his lack of reasons-responsiveness
leaves him exempt from the moral community: he lacks the ability to produce an action which
is the result of reasons which is sensitive to any other reasons. There is no reason such that
Jones' decision to act will be impacted or changed, no matter how powerful, due to Black's
interference in the actual world.
The realization is that Fischer's concept of ownership should be robust enough to
recognize that a lack of a reasons-responsive mechanism on the part of an agent denies the
agent full ownership of his actions as he can act against his own interests and even his will.
This kind of compulsion is something for which we have sympathy, and as it is a kind of
compulsion, Fischer should recognize that Jones is compelled to do as he does not only
because the actual sequence necessitated that he do so, but, also, that he is compelled by
Black because Black removes from Jones his reasons-responsive mechanism in this instance.
Moreover, agents in a causally determined world may not be compelled in this way; they may
maintain reasons-responsive mechanisms and it is this mechanism which is necessary for
moral responsibility.
However, this mechanism may be insufficient, as it does not enable us to present
agents in that universe with deontological shoulds. We are regulated to, if we wish to be
rational, only presenting teleological shoulds. For an agent to be morally responsible for an
event, it is likely that he needs more than just reasons-responsiveness; it is likely that we
should be able to rationally tell him, "You should have done otherwise," and actually mean
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that he actually should have done otherwise. Conversely, this need not mean that we cannot
state that he should have done otherwise in a teleological sense due to his reasons-responsive
mechanism. We should also then realize, when doling out praise and blame, that to treat the
agent as a prime mover, who actually was physically capable of committing a different act
given all of the same preceding events is irrational; instead, we should treat the agent as part
mover and part moved, both a victim and one who willingly brings about events. For this
reason, though it may be that we are morally responsible, it seems that we should not blame
ourselves too much or praise ourselves too much either.

In the end, the FrankfurtlFischer model fails in two important ways when the model
includes causal determinism or fully restricts Jones. First, the power of Frankfurt's model is in
demonstrating that we care more about why the agent acts than PAP would lead us to believe.
Frankfurt, very powerfully, points out that an agent's intentional states can make the agent
blameworthy, even when the agent is fated to commit the act. However, when the model is
one that assumes causal determinism, or restricts Jones fully, Jones is no longer a fit member
of the moral community. In other words, what Fischer misses is that it is important to us that
an agent deliberates using a mechanism which actually has the capacity to deliberate fully.
Fischer attempts to distract us from this intuition by arguing that the agent in question still has
a reason-responsive mechanism, but upon examination of his account, what we realize is that
in the Jones-Black case Jones is only potentially reasons-responsive. Whilst it may be true
that there is a possible world in which he can respond to sufficient reason, this in not an
ability he has in the actual world. If we blame Jones, then, we are in effect blaming a moral
zombie and then asserting that it is still rational to do so because he is potentially not a moral
zombie. Simply, the possible world in which Jones is actually reasons-responsive, as opposed
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to just reasons-resultant is not near enough to assert that his is morally responsive in both.
More importantly, by both Frankfurt's and Fischer's own reasoning, what we are most
concerned about is not the counter-factual, but, instead, the actual sequence. In the actual
world, Jones is a moral zombie-his mechanism for practical reasoning cannot be swayed by
any reason, no matter how powerful.
There is a difference for blaming an agent for committing an act and blaming an agent
as ifhe could have done otherwise. The first is the kind of moral responsibility that they may
be entitled to use-they can point at agents and say, "Well you committed that act, and it was
the direct result of your intentional states (regardless of restrictions), and so shame on you for
what you have done. You have not brought about the world as we wish it to be." Even if they
are correct, and this is reasonable (ignoring my concerns about zombie-ness), what Frankfurt
and Fischer seem to be trying to smuggle in-but should not-is the ability to also say to that
agent, "You really should have done other than you have done." When confronted with the
Consequence Argument, statements using this kind of language are not rational. Moreover,
moral language which presupposed this kind of imperative should be avoided, as it makes an
irrational claim-that an agent should have done the impossible. It may well be that in the
actual world Jones' actions are reasons-resultant, but if there is no reason which can dissuade
Jones from doing as he does, not only is he essentially a moral zombie, but if those actions are
also necessitated, our ability to use "shoulds" to indicate what he actually should have done is
greatly restricted. In this way, Jones may not be a proper object of moral ascriptions at all.
Having said this, as causal determinism need not necessitate fatalism and eliminate robust
reasons-responsiveness, it is not certain that agents in a causally determined universe cannot
be held accountable, at least to some degree.
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What I have done in this work is consider the soundness of Frankfurt's argument that
PAP is false and the implications ofthis for holding agents responsible in a causally
determined universe. It does seem that Frankfurt is presented with a serious problem when we
consider whether his case of Jones and Black restricts Jones' intentions. If Jones' intentional
states are restricted, it may well be that Frankfurt begs the question as Goetz contends.
Nevertheless, Frankfurt does seem to be pointing clearly to the fact that many of us to
continue to hold Jones' responsible despite Jones' lack of alternative possibilities.
What Fischer's work does is present us with the possibility that the reason why we
continue to hold Jones responsible, is because of the kind of control that Jones seems to
maintain. He contends that because Jones has guidance control of his actions, Jones is morally
responsible. My contention has been that Jones does not have sufficient control to be held
responsible because, despite Fischer claim to the contrary, Jones does not actually have a
reasons-responsive mechanism and, so, Jones also does not guidance control. Instead, it seems
that Jones' actions are only reasons-resultant as he cannot actually respond to reasons-even
in relevantly similar possible worlds.
Finally, what we come to realize is, despite this problem, the Consequence Argument
does not necessarily restrict an agent in the same way that Jones is restricted in the
Frankfurtian counter-examples. It can be reasonably argued that agents in a causally
determined universe retain reasons-responsive mechanisms and so their actions are not only
reasons-result-unlike Jones' actions. This does not negate the problems presented by the
Consequent Argument, though. Causal determinism does prevent us from being able to state
rationally that an agent should do otherwise than he did, as doing otherwise was impossible.
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Therefore, although we may hold the agent morally responsible, we cannot rationally state he
should not have done as he did.
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